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In this paper we characterize the equilibrium in a labor market where employed workers
search on the job and ﬁrms direct the search by announcing wages and employment probabil-
ities for the applicants. All workers/jobs are homogeneous and free entry of ﬁrms determines
the number of jobs. The equilibrium features a wage ladder, with a ﬁnite number of rungs.
Workers on each particular rung of the ladder choose (optimally) to apply to only the jobs at
one level above their current wage, despite that they observe all higher wage oﬀers. Workers
choose not to leap several rungs at a time on the wage ladder because the jobs at one level
above their current wage provide a signiﬁcantly higher employment probability, and hence a
higher expected surplus, than the jobs at two or more levels above. The wage ladder has the
following properties: (i) The gap between two adjacent rungs on the ladder becomes smaller
and smaller as wage increases; (ii) A worker’s quit rate decreases with wage; (iii)Aw o r k e r ’ s
wage, on average, increases with the employment duration; (iv) The average length of time
an unemployed worker will take to return to his previous wage increases with that wage; (v)
The density of oﬀer wages decreases with wage; (vi) The density of employed wages can be
decreasing, increasing, or hump-shaped. The directed search framework replicates empirical
regularities on the wage path of workers and the distribution of oﬀer and employed wages that
undirected search cannot.
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We study a large labor market where employed workers search on the job and ﬁrms direct the
search process intentionally. All workers are identical. The number of workers is large and ﬁxed,
while the number of jobs (also identical) is determined by free entry. All ﬁrms simultaneously
announce a wage level and an employment probability for an applicant. The applicants, including
unemployed ones, ﬁrst observe all oﬀers and then decide which job to apply to. After receiving
the applicants, a ﬁrm selects one and pays the announced wage. Search is directed, in the sense
that ﬁrms explicitly take into account how their oﬀers will aﬀect workers’ application strategies.
The game repeats without memory. Recruiting generates endogenous transitions of workers
between jobs, while exogenous separation sends workers into unemployment. We characterize the
stationary equilibrium in this market and study its properties.
Table 1. Search models
whether employed workers are allowed
to search on the job





Burdett and Judd (1983)





Acemoglu and Shimer (1999)
Burdett et al. (2001)
This paper
Directed search on the job is a realistic feature of the labor market.1 However, the search
literature (see Table 1 for a rough guide) oﬀers very little knowledge about the equilibrium with
directed search on the job. The popular search models assume that search is undirected,e . g . ,
Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1990). That is, ﬁrms ignore how their oﬀers
aﬀect the number of matches they will receive and workers do not choose which job to apply to
ex ante, although workers do choose whether to accept a job ex post. These popular models also
rule out on-the-job search by assuming that unemployed workers are the only workers who search.
The subsequent research has relaxed these two assumptions separately but not simultaneously.
For example, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Pissarides (1994) examine undirected search
on the job, while Peters (1991), Montgomery (1991), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and Burdett
et al. (2001) examine directed search without on-the-job search.2 Our focus in this paper will
1Reviewing the evidence by Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Pissarides (1994) concludes that about 20% of the
monthly hires in the US are direct job-to-job movements. He argues that this fraction is about 40% in UK.
2Burdett and Judd (1983) analyzed sequential asearch in the goods market and did not frame their model
as on-the-job search. However, the key element in their model, that some agents each have two or more price
quotes while others have only one, is borrowed by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) to generate wage dispersion with
on-the-job search. Similarly, Peters (1991) analyzed directed search in the goods market, but his analysis can be
1be on the characterization of the equilibrium with the combined feature of directed search and
on-the-job search.
Our study is also motivated by the fact that existing search models fail to capture some
important aspects of the wage distribution among homogeneous workers with homogeneous jobs.
First, with undirected search on the job, the density of the wage distribution is a strictly increasing
function, but the empirical density is hump-shaped with the hump occurring at a low wage level
(see Kiefer and Neumann (1993)).3 Second, workers seem to climb up the wage ladder over time
in reality, which existing search models fail to produce. In particular, wage dispersion in models
with undirected search on the job does not constitute a wage ladder, because all workers can
ascend immediately to the end of the wage spectrum with positive probability.
Of course, one can introduce heterogeneity among workers or jobs into existing models to make
their predictions more realistic. To generate the hump-shaped wage distribution, for example, one
may argue that workers diﬀer in ability or that jobs diﬀer in productivity. To generate gradual
wage increases, one may argue that workers’ abilities are gradually observed by their employers
(e.g., Jovanovic (1979)), or there is match-speciﬁc productivity, or there is learning-by-doing on
the job. These ex ante and ex post sources of heterogeneity are realistic, and our work does
not diminish their importance. However, because there is sizable dispersion of wages in the data
among similar workers with similar jobs, it is useful to explore theoretical models that generate
wage dispersion among homogeneous workers, as we do here.
We show that the equilibrium with directed search on the job is a wage ladder, which comprises
of a ﬁnite number of wage levels. Firms are indiﬀerent between posting these equilibrium wages. A
ﬁrm oﬀering a higher wage is compensated by a higher probability of hiring a worker successfully.
The expected surplus of a recruiting ﬁrm (i.e., the product of the hiring probability and the
ex post surplus) is the same at all equilibrium wages. This expected surplus exactly covers the
vacancy cost, and so all recruiting ﬁrms earn zero net expected proﬁt. In contrast, workers are
not indiﬀerent between the diﬀerent wages in equilibrium. An applicant chooses to apply to only
such jobs that oﬀer him the maximum expected surplus (i.e., the employment probability times
the ex post gain from the job). These jobs lie one rung above the applicant’s current wage on
the ladder. That is, workers choose to climb up the wage ladder over time, one rung at a time,
rather than leap on the ladder.
The wage ladder has strong implications on equilibrium wages and worker ﬂows. First, the
gap between two adjacent rungs on the ladder becomes smaller and smaller as wage increases,
and so the marginal gain from climbing up on the ladder diminishes. Second, a worker’s quit rate
readily adapted to the labor market. Other examples of directed search models are Cao and Shi (2000), Julien et
al (2000), Peters (2000), Shi (2001, 2002a,b), and Shimer (2001).
3In directed search models without on-the-job search, a wage diﬀerential can arise among homogeneous workers
who work for homogeneous jobs, but some additional elements must be introduced. In Shi (2002a), ﬁrms are
diﬀerent in size (i.e., the number of employees), where large ﬁrms pay higher wages than small ﬁrms do. In
Shi (2002b) and Shimer (2001), the presence of high-skill workers induces partial sorting and generates a wage
diﬀerential among low-skill workers.
2decreases with wage, because the probability of getting a higher wage falls as the worker climbs up
the ladder. Third, a worker’s wage, on average, increases with his employment duration, because
a longer duration is likely to indicate that the worker has climbed more rungs on the wage ladder.
Fourth, the average length of time an unemployed worker will take to return to his previous wage
increases with that wage. Fifth, the density of oﬀer wages is a strictly decreasing function; i.e.,
there are more ﬁrms recruiting at a low wage than at a high wage. This occurs despite the fact
that a high wage makes hiring more successful than a low wage. Finally, the density of employed
wages can decrease with wage, but not always so. Although there are more vacancies at a low
wage than at a high wage, which generates a large ﬂow of workers into a low wage, there are
also more workers quitting low-wage jobs. Depending on which of these two ﬂows dominates, the
density of employed wages can be decreasing, increasing, or hump-shaped. In particular, when
a low-wage job has a suﬃciently higher inﬂow of workers than a high-wage job, the density of
employed wages is a decreasing function.4
The wage ladder and its properties occur here without any of the familiar assumptions that
induce gradual wage increases. In particular, (i) there is no gradual revelation of workers’ produc-
tivity, learning-by-doing or match-speciﬁc productivity, as all workers have the same productivity
which is observable before match; (ii) there is no diﬀerential information among employed workers
regarding job openings, as all employed applicants observe all job openings before they apply;
and (iii) ﬁrms do not discriminate employed workers according to their current wages, as each
ﬁrm selects all applicants it receives with the same probability in equilibrium. Rather, a worker
chooses to apply to only the jobs one level about his current wage because such jobs oﬀer a
signiﬁcantly higher employment probability, and hence higher expected surplus for the applicant,
than other jobs do.
To understand this result better, imagine two applicants who are currently employed at,
respectively, a low wage and a high wage. These two applicants diﬀer in the trade-oﬀ between
the wage and the employment probability, because their current wages are diﬀerent. A high-wage
applicant cares more about the wage level and less about that employment probability than a
low-wage applicant does. More precisely, since the same wage oﬀer yields a lower ex post gain to a
high-wage applicant than to a low-wage applicant, the same amount of increase in the wage oﬀer
represents a larger proportional increase in the expected surplus to a high-wage applicant than to
a low-wage applicant. Exploring this diﬀerence in the trade-oﬀ, ﬁrms can separate the groups of
applicants by oﬀering high-wage applicants a high wage with a low employment probability and
low-wage applicants a low wage with a high employment probability. In a stationary equilibrium,
the separation produces the wage ladder. Clearly, directed search and on-the-job search are both
important for supporting the wage ladder as an equilibrium.
4With the wage ladder, workers employed at low wages do not apply to very high wages. This contributes
in part to the decreasing density at high wage levels. As a comparison, the undirected search model of Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) produces the result that workers at all wage levels apply to the highest wage with positive
probability, which generates a much higher density of workers employed at the highest wage than at lower wages.
3Before specifying the model, it may be useful to preview the analytical diﬃculty of combining
on-the-job search with directed search. The source of the diﬃculty is that on-the-job search makes
a worker’s application strategy in the future depend on his current application strategy (i.e. where
to apply now inﬂuences where to apply next once that new wage is obtained). A recruiting ﬁrm
anticipates and explores this dependence, which makes the equilibrium a complicated ﬁxed-point
problem. This complexity does not arise when on-the-job search is excluded, because then all
separations are exogenous. Because of the complexity, a large part of this paper will be devoted
to characterizing the equilibrium in a tractable way.
2. A Model of Directed Search On the Job
2.1. The Labor Market and Job Search
A labor market is populated by a large (exogenous) number, L, of risk neutral and inﬁnitely-lived
workers. All workers are identical. When employed, a worker supplies one unit of labor and
produces y units of output per unit of time. When unemployed, a worker receives an unem-
ployment beneﬁt, b. The unemployment rate u is endogenous. For convenience, we refer to a
worker’s wage as the worker’s type and call a worker at wage w a w-worker. Also, we refer to
b as an unemployed worker’s “wage” and write w0 = b. There are also a large number of ﬁrms,
determined endogenously by free entry, each of which has one job to oﬀer. All jobs are the same,
and the cost of a vacancy per unit of time is C>0. Time is continuous. Workers and ﬁrms
discount future at a rate of time preference r>0.
Employed workers search on the job. A worker employed at wage w receives an opportunity
of job application at rate λ(w) > 0, according to the Poisson process. The opportunity allows
the worker to observe the job descriptions oﬀered by all ﬁrms. We set λ(w)=λ for all employed
workers in order to ensure that the diﬀerence in λ between workers is not the cause of wage
dispersion in this paper. A job description consists of a wage oﬀer and the ﬁrm’s selection rule
(described later). All recruiting ﬁrms announce the job descriptions simultaneously and commit
to them. After observing the job descriptions, applicants choose their application strategies
simultaneously. Each applicant can apply to only one job and must incur a small ﬁxed cost S>0
for the application.5 The application strategy can be mixed over the job openings. Because the
applicants observe ﬁrms’ oﬀers before the application, a ﬁrm can choose the oﬀer intentionally to
attract particular applicants, i.e., to direct workers’ search.
Once employed, a worker produces and is paid the posted wage until separation, either ex-
ogenously or endogenously. Exogenous separation occurs at rate σ > 0a c c o r d i n gt ot h eP o i s s o n
process, after which the worker returns to the unemployment pool. Endogenous separation oc-
curs when a worker quits the current job to accept another job. As in many models of on-the-job
search, e.g., Burdett and Mortensen (1998), we assume that a worker’s current employer does
5The small cost S is needed here to help the existence of an equilibrium. See subsection 4.2.
4not match outside oﬀers. This assumption may not be realistic, but it serves two purposes here.
First, it keeps our model comparable to other on-the-job search models. Second, it makes the
model tractable and serves as a benchmark.
Unemployed workers’ search is directed in the same way as an employed worker’s search. Let
λ0 be the arrival rate of a job application opportunity to an unemployed worker. In general,
λ0 6= λ, but our analysis applies equally well to the special case λ0 = λ.A l l o w i n g f o r λ0 6= λ,
we can nest directed search models without on-the-job search as a special case, as discussed
immediately below.
The combination of on-the-job search and directed search is a unique feature. It distinguishes
our model from directed search models in the literature, such as Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and
Burdett, et al. (2001), which allow only unemployed workers to search. Those models correspond
to the special case λ =0< λ0. Another dimension of comparison is with on-the-job search models
that assume undirected search, e.g., Burdett and Mortensen (1998). The most important feature
of directed search is that each applicant observes many oﬀers before application. The indued ex
ante competition between recruiting ﬁrms is central to our results.6
Nevertheless, our model has the following frictions that are familiar in previous search models.
First, job application opportunities are not abundant, in the sense that λ and λ0 are ﬁnite. This
is a proxy for the cost of gathering information about jobs. Second, each applicant can apply to
only a small number of jobs at a time, which is set to be one in our paper. This is a proxy for
the constraint that an applicant can attend only one interview at a time. Third, agents cannot
coordinate their decisions, which creates the possibility of unmatched agents.
Let wage levels lie in the set of real numbers, <.L e t N(.) be the cumulative distribution
function of workers over wages, with a density function n(.) .B e c a u s ew ec l a s s i f yt h eu n e m p l o y -
ment beneﬁt as a “wage” level, the mass of the distribution N at w0 = b is equal to u.T h e
distributional density of (employed) workers over wages in <\{b} is n(.)/(1 − u), which is also
called the employed wage density.L e tV (.) be the cumulative distribution function of vacancies
over wages. The corresponding density function, denoted v(.), is called the oﬀer wage density.
Let K be the total number of vacancies, which is endogenous, and denote k = K/L.T h en u m b e r
of vacancies at wage w is v(w)K.
We are interested in the equilibrium in a large market, i.e., one in which L →∞ . However,
to detail agents’ strategies, we will ﬁr s ta n a l y z eam a r k e tw h e r eL is large and ﬁnite, and then
take the limit L →∞ .7 The expected number of w-applicants is λn(w)L (or λ0uL if w = w0).
Assume that this number is an integer, without loss of generality.
6The assumption that each applicant observes all ﬁrms’ oﬀers before applying to one simpliﬁes the analysis, but
it is not necessary for the analytical results. For ex ante competition to occur, it is suﬃc i e n tt oa s s u m et h a te a c h
applicant observes two oﬀers that are randomly drawn from all recruiting ﬁrms’ oﬀers.
7We view continuous wage distributions as the limits of discrete distributions. This procedure avoids possi-
ble measurability problems associated with analyzing individuals’ strategies directly in an environment with a
continuous wage distribution.
52.2. Strategies, Payoﬀsa n dD e c i s i o n s
Call a w-worker who has just received a job application opportunity a w-applicant. If w = w0,
the applicant is unemployed. To unify the notation for employed and unemployed workers, let
λ(w) be the arrival rate of a job application to a w-worker, where λ(w)=λ for all w 6= w0 and
λ(w0)=λ0.
A w-applicant’s strategy is an application probability function p(.,w): < → [0,1], where
p(w0,w) is the probability with which the applicant applies to each of the job openings at wage
w0. An implicit assumption is that the applicant must assign equal probability to apply to all
identical job openings. Also, all applicants of the same type use the same strategy. Denote
T(w)={w0 : p(w0,w) > 0},w h i c hi saw-applicant’s target set of wages.
The probability p(.,w) is not a convenient object to use in a large market. Because there
will be many ﬁrms oﬀering each wage, an applicant will apply to each of these ﬁrms with a very
small probability. That is, p(w0,w) → 0 for all w0.T o ﬁnd a convenient object to describe an
applicant’s strategy, notice that the expected number of w-applicants whom a ﬁrm oﬀering w0
will receive is:
a(w0,w)=p(w0,w)λ(w)n(w)L.( 2 . 1 )
Recall that λ(w)n(w)L is the expected number of w-applicants. Term a(w0,w)t h equeue length
of w-applicants for a ﬁrm that posts wage w0. Because a(w0,w) > 0 if and only if p(w0,w) >
0, the queue length represents an applicant’s strategy well. Moreover, if p(w0,w) > 0i na
ﬁnite market, a(w0,w) remains strictly positive even when the market becomes large. For these
reasons, we describe a w-applicant’s strategy as a function a(.,w): < → <+.D e n o t e A(w)=
{a(w0,w)}w0∈<. Then, a w-applicant’s target set is T(w)={w0 : a(w0,w) > 0}. Because the




A recruiting ﬁrm announces a job description, which consists of a wage level w ∈ < and a
criterion that determines which applicant will get the job. This ex post selection criterion depends
on the distribution of applicants whom the ﬁrm will receive or attract. Because the applicants
use mixed strategies to apply to identical jobs, the distribution of applicants whom the ﬁrm will
receive is stochastic. For each realization of such random variables, the selection criterion must
be speciﬁed. This is cumbersome but, fortunately, it is not necessary. For the decision problems,
it suﬃces for the ﬁrm to specify an “ex ante” employment probability, denoted q(w,w0), for each
applicant of type w0 (see the supplementary Appendix G for a proof). The probability q(w,w0)
is the probability with which a w0-applicant gets a job w when he applies to the job, and it is
calculated by aggregating ex post employment probabilities over all realizations of the distribution
of applicants whom the ﬁrm will receive. We refer to q simply as the employment probability.
It is optimal for a ﬁrm to give the same employment probability to all applicants. That is,
q(w,w0)=q(w) for all w0 (see the supplementary Appendix G for a proof). This is because the
6ﬁrm’s probability of successfully hiring a worker is a concave function of the expected number of
applicants whom the ﬁrm will attract (see (2.3) later). By giving equal employment probability
to all applicants, the ﬁrm maximizes the hiring probability and, because all workers have the
same productivity, the strategy maximizes the expected surplus from recruiting.8 Therefore, a
recruiting ﬁrm’s strategy is to announce a wage level w ∈ < and an employment probability
q(w) ∈ [0,1] for every applicant. Let Q = {q(w)}w∈< be a proﬁle of employment probabilities
across oﬀer wages.
To describe the agents’ payoﬀs, let Je(w) be the value function of a worker who is currently
employed at wage w,a n dJu = Je(w0) the value function of an unemployed worker. For ﬁrms,
let Jv be the value function of a vacancy and Jf(w)o faﬁrm that currently employs a worker at
w. We will calculate these value functions later.
A w0-applicant’s payoﬀ of applying for a job w is the expected surplus, q(w)[Je(w) − Je(w0)].
This applicant chooses a(w,w0) > 0 if and only if the expected surplus is greater than or equal
to the maximum of expected surplus that the applicant can get elsewhere. Call this maximum
expected surplus the applicant’s market surplus and denote it E(w0). In a large market, individual
agents take such market surpluses as given.9 Then, a w0-applicant’s optimal choice of a(w,w0)





= ∞,i f q(w)[Je(w) − Je(w0)] >E (w0)
∈ [0,∞), if q(w)[Je(w) − Je(w0)] = E(w0)
= 0, otherwise.
(2.2)
In the ﬁrst case, the queue length of w0-applicants for a ﬁrm oﬀering w is inﬁnite because every w0-
applicant applies to the ﬁrm with probability one and there are a large number of such applicants.
In the last case, the queue length of w0-applicants for a ﬁrm is zero because such applicants have
no incentive to apply to the ﬁrm. These two cases will not arise when w is an equilibrium wage.10
Thus, if w is an equilibrium wage, the expected surplus of applying to a ﬁrm posting w must be
equal to the applicant’s market surplus.
The payoﬀ of a ﬁrm posting (w,q(w)) is the expected surplus, h[Jf(w)−Jv], where h denotes
the ﬁrm’s probability of successfully hiring a worker. This hiring probability is a function of both
w and q(w), but we shorten it to h(w). Because a ﬁrm fails to recruit a worker only when all







8When workers are heterogeneous in productivity, recruiting ﬁrms may give diﬀerent priorities to diﬀerent
workers, see Shi (2002b) and Shimer (2001).
9Peters (2000), Cao and Shi (2000), and Burdett, et al. (2001) analyze directed search without imposing this
assumption. They show that the eﬀect of each individual agent’s actions on the worker’s market surplus becomes
negligible when the size of the market approaches inﬁnity.
10If a(w,w
0)=∞,t h e ne a c hw
0-applicant who applies to a ﬁrm oﬀering w is chosen with probability 0. The
expected surplus is 0 in this case, and hence cannot be higher than the applicant’s market surplus, contradicting
the condition required for a(w,w
0)=∞. On the other hand, if a(w,w
0) = 0, then the ﬁrm oﬀering w does not
attract any applicant, and so w is not an equilibrium wage.
7Using the queue length deﬁned in (2.1) and the fact that (1 − p)









Thus, a ﬁrm’s hiring probability increases with the queue length of applicants whom the ﬁrm will
attract. Moreover, the hiring probability is a concave function of the queue length.
To ﬁnd the link between the hiring probability and the employment probability, notice that
the hiring probability can also be interpreted as the expected number of workers that the ﬁrm
hires, because the ﬁrm hires only one worker for a job. This interpretation implies the relationship
h(w)=q(w)
P
w0 a(w,w0). Combining this with the above formula, we have the following negative


















Let Ψ−1 be the inverse of Ψ,s ot h a th(w)=Ψ−1(q(w)). The function Ψ is decreasing because
a ﬁrm is able to provide a high employment probability to applicants only when the ﬁrm will
receive a small number of applicants, in which case the ﬁrm’s hiring probability must be low.
We can formulate a recruiting ﬁrm’s decisions (w,q(w)) as follows:






≥ E(w0), for all w0 such that T(w0) 3 w. (2.6)
The ﬁrm takes other ﬁrms’ decisions and the applicants’ market surpluses as given.
The above formulation captures the key feature of directed search — the trade-oﬀ between
wage and the probability of forming a match. For a recruiting ﬁrm, a higher wage oﬀer is likely
to yield a lower value Jf, but it is also likely to attract more applicants and increase the hiring
probability. The ﬁrm chooses such an oﬀer (w,q(w)) that maximizes its expected surplus. For
an applicant, a higher wage oﬀer is likely to yield a higher value of employment Je, but it is also
likely to come with a lower employment probability. The applicant applies only to those ﬁrms
whose oﬀer (w,q(w)) maximizes the applicant’s expected surplus, as the dual to (P) suggests.
Now we specify the value functions and the endogenous separation probability. Because an
employee quits only when he gets a job from another ﬁrm, the endogenous separation probability










8The value functions are given as follows:
rJv = −C + h(w)[Jf(w) − Jv], (2.8)
rJf(w)=( y − w) − [σ + ρ(w)][Jf(w) − Jv], (2.9)
rJe(w)=
"






w0 q(w0)[Je(w0) − Je(w)]a(w0,w)v(w0),
#
(2.10)










The function χ(.) in (2.10) is an indicator function, with χ(Σa)=1i fΣa>0a n dχ(Σa)=0i f
Σa =0 .
We explain (2.10) for example. Eq. (2.10) equates the permanent income of a worker employed
at wage w, rJe(w), to the expected “cash ﬂo w ”i ns u c he m p l o y m e n t .T h ec a s hﬂow consists of
the current wage, the loss in value in the event of exogenous separation, and the expected gain
from searching on the job. The gain from searching on the job is the diﬀerence between the last
two terms in (2.10). If this diﬀerence is non-positive, the worker will choose Σa =0 ,i nw h i c h
case the last two terms in the equation are zero.
2.3. Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
As formulated above, each ﬁrm can choose to post any number w ∈ < as the wage level. However,
the set of equilibrium wage oﬀers is Ω ≡ {w ∈ < : v(w) > 0}.D e ﬁne w1 =i n f ( Ω)a n dwM =
sup(Ω). Let Ω0 = Ω ∪ {w0} and call Ω0 the extended support of equilibrium wages. Clearly, the
accumulative distribution of wages over Ω0 is N(.); the density of employed workers over Ω is
n(.)/(1 − u), and the density of vacancies (or oﬀer wages) over Ω is v(.).
Deﬁnition 2.1. A (symmetric) equilibrium in the labor market consists of the aggregate char-
acteristics (Ω,N(.),V(.),k), the proﬁle of employment probabilities Q =( q(w))w, and the ap-
plicants’ strategies (A(w))w,w h e r eA(w)=( a(w0,w))w0, such that the following requirements
are met: (i) Given the aggregate characteristics and other ﬁrms’ strategies, each ﬁrm’s decision
(w,q(w)) is optimal, and w ∈ Ω; (ii) Given the ﬁrms’ decisions and the aggregate characteris-
tics, each applicant’s application decision is optimal; (iii) The agents’ strategies are symmetric
within each type, in the sense described earlier; (iv) There is free entry of ﬁrms: Jv =0for every
recruiting ﬁrm; (v) The aggregate characteristics are stationary.
In the symmetric equilibrium, p(w0,w)=1 /[v(w0)K]i fw0 ∈ T(w)a n d0o t h e r w i s e . S o ,
a(w0,w)=λ(w)n(w)/[v(w0)k]i fw0 ∈ T(w) and 0 otherwise. Also, as required by the equilibrium,
we will set Jv = 0 in the remainder of this paper.
93. Conﬁguration of the Equilibrium
3.1. Separation of Applicants by Their Current Wages
We establish the following lemma that will be central to our analysis.
Lemma 3.1. (Singleton) If there is an equilibrium, then each equilibrium wage attracts at
most one type of applicants. Precisely, a(w∗,w i)a(w∗,w j)=0for all wi,w j,w∗ ∈ Ω0 with
w∗ >w j >w i, provided that Je(.) is an increasing function.
Proof. Because the lemma is trivially true for w∗ = w1 (= inf Ω), we examine a ﬁrm posting
w∗ >w 1. The decision problem is (P), with w being replaced by w∗, q(w)b yq(w∗), etc.. Shorten
the notation q(w∗)t oq∗. Suppose that (w∗,q∗) is an equilibrium oﬀer. As concluded earlier, the
constraint (2.6) must hold as equality for all types of applicants whom the ﬁrm attracts. Moreover,
the constraint (2.6) must be binding on the ﬁr mf o ra tl e a s to n et y p eo fa p p l i c a n t sw h o mt h e
ﬁrm attracts; otherwise, the ﬁrm should set q∗ = 0 to maximize the hiring probability, which
contradicts a non-binding constraint.
Suppose that the applicants’ constraint binds for w0 = wi,w i t hwi <w j.C o n s i d e r a n
alternative oﬀer ( b w, b q), where b w = w∗ +ε, b q[Je( b w)−Je(wj)] = E(wj)=q∗[Je(w∗)−Je(wj)], and
ε > 0 is an arbitrarily small number. Under the presumption that Je(.) is an increasing function
(veriﬁed later), b q<q ∗. Then,
b q[Je( b w) − Je(wi)] = q∗[Je(w∗) − Je(wi)] − (q∗ − b q)[Je(wj) − Je(wi)]
<q ∗[Je(w∗) − Je(wi)] = E(wi).
The inequality follows from the facts that q>b q and Je(wj) >J e(wi). Thus, the new oﬀer ( b w, b q)
still attracts wj-applicants but not wi-applicants. Because this eliminates a binding constraint
on the ﬁrm’s decision problem with very little change in the oﬀer, the ﬁrm’s expected surplus
increases, contradicting the supposition that (w∗,q∗) is an equilibrium oﬀer.
The proof is similar if the applicant’s constraint binds for w0 = wj under the oﬀer (w∗,q∗).
In this case, construct the alternative oﬀer by setting b w = w∗ −ε and b q[Je( b w)−Je(wi)] = E(wi).
This alternative oﬀer attracts wi-applicants but not wj-applicants, and it increases the ﬁrm’s
expected surplus. QED
The above lemma holds because the indiﬀerence curves of any two types of applicants have
the following single-crossing property.11 The higher an applicant’s type (i.e., his current wage),
the lower the ex post surplus he can obtain from a given wage; so, a given amount of increase
in the wage oﬀer represents a larger proportional increase in the expected surplus to a high-type
applicant than to a low-type applicant. Put diﬀerently, a high-type applicant cares more about
the wage level that an oﬀer provides, and less about the employment probability, than a low-type
11The required condition that Je(w)i n c r e a s e sw i t hw holds in all previous search models and, as veriﬁed later,
it holds in our model as well.
10applicant does. Thus, there is no combination of the employment probability and wage that is
most attractive to both high- and low-type applicants and yet maximizes the ﬁrm’s expected
surplus from recruiting. If any symmetric equilibrium exists, each equilibrium wage must attract
only one type of applicants.
We depict the single-crossing property in Figure 1. An applicant’s indiﬀerence curve is derived




,a l lw0 such that a(w,w0) > 0. (3.1)
This is a negative relationship between the employment probability and wage, as a low wage
must be compensated by a high employment probability in order to induce an applicant to apply.
Figure 1 depicts two such indiﬀerence curves, one for the applicants of type w0 = wi and the other
for w0 = wj >w i. The indiﬀerence curve of the high-wage applicant (wj-applicant) crosses that
of the low-wage applicant from above, which reﬂects the diﬀerence discussed above between the
two applicants in the willingness to trade-oﬀ the employment probability for wage. In Figure 1,
we also depict the iso-proﬁt curve in Figure 1, which summarizes diﬀerent combinations of (q,w)
that yield the same level of expected surplus to the recruiting ﬁrm.
  q
 indifference curve
  for worker wj (wj>wi)
direction of higher
expected utility
          A    indifference curve
    for worker wi
        B
direction of
higher expected
surplus for firm iso-profit curve
   w
Figure 1
Figure 1 provides the following illustration of Lemma Singleton. If the ﬁrm attracts both
types of applicants, the ﬁrm’s oﬀer must be at the intersection of these two indiﬀerence curves
(point A). For this oﬀer to be optimal for the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm’s iso-proﬁt curve must be tangent to
the applicants’ indiﬀerence curves. This is not possible. If the ﬁrm’s iso-proﬁt curve is tangent to
wi-applicants’ indiﬀerence curve at point A,t h eﬁrm can increase expected surplus by oﬀering the
combination at point B that is attractive to only wj-applicants. Similarly, if the ﬁrm’s iso-proﬁt
curve is tangent to wj-applicants’ indiﬀerence curve at point A,t h eﬁrm can increase expected
surplus by increasing q and reducing w along wi-applicants’ indiﬀerence curve.
Lemma Singleton provides a sharp contrast between an equilibrium with directed search on
the job and an equilibrium with undirected search on the job. In the undirected search model
by Burdett and Mortensen (1998), the equilibrium wage support is a continuum. There, because
11of undirected search, each ﬁrm receives applicants from all wage levels with positive probability,
regardless of the ﬁrm’s oﬀer. All equilibrium wage oﬀers yield the same expected surplus to the
ﬁrm. Applicants are not indiﬀerent between those wages, but they cannot choose ex ante which
wage to apply to. This construct is no longer an equilibrium when search is directed, because
applicants will apply only to the openings which yield the highest expected surplus to them.
3.2. Equilibrium Conﬁguration
To construct the equilibrium, we assume that the recruiting ﬁrm’s decision problem (P)h a sa
unique solution for each type of applicants.12 Then, the dual of (P) also has a unique solution.
That is, for each type w of applicants, the target set of wages T(w) is singleton. Without
confusion, we now refer to T(w) as this single target wage level rather than the set. Then, the
equilibrium must be a wage ladder with a ﬁnite number of rungs. The argument proceeds as
follows.
First, an employed applicant’s target wage is strictly higher than his current wage; i.e., T(w) >
w for all w 6= w0. This is because workers employed at all wages receive a job application
opportunity at the same rate λ and have the same access to all job openings. By applying to a
job that oﬀers the same wage as his current wage, an applicant incurs the ﬁxed application cost
without any gain. By applying to a wage lower than his current wage, an applicant loses even
more because of the wage reduction.
The same argument applies to an unemployed applicant if λ0 ≥ λ.H o w e v e r ,i fλ0 < λ,t h e n
it is possible that T(w0) <w 0. In this case, an unemployed applicant may accept a wage lower
than the unemployment beneﬁt in an attempt to gain a better access to higher wages.
Second, the path of future equilibrium wages starting from any equilibrium wage w (including
w0)c o n t a i n so n l yaﬁnite number of wage levels. This path is the sequence (Ti(w))
j
i=1,w h e r e
Ti(w)=Ti−1(T(w)) for all i.T h en u m b e rj is ﬁnite because there are costs for ﬁrms to maintain
a vacancy and for workers to apply for jobs. The diﬀerence between any two adjacent wage levels,
Ti(w)−Ti−1(w), must be bounded below by a strictly positive number in order to cover the ﬁxed
application cost. In a ﬁnite number of steps, the ascending wage sequence will reach a level at
which recruiting yields an expected surplus below the vacancy cost.
Third, every employed wage in the equilibrium can be reached in a ﬁnite number of steps
from w0.T h a ti s ,f o re v e r yw ∈ Ω, there exists a non-negative integer j such that w = Tj(w0).
To see this, suppose that an equilibrium wage w ∈ Ω cannot be reached from w0.T h e nw ec a n
trace backward to ﬁnd the source of this wage, using the sequence {T−i(w)}i≥0,w h e r eT−1 is
the inverse function of T. Given the features of T discussed above, T−1 is a strictly decreasing
function and the diﬀerence [T−(i−1)(w)−T−i(w)] is bounded below by a strictly positive amount
for any i ≥ 1. Thus, the descending sequence {T−i(w)}i≥0 reaches a minimum in a ﬁnite number
of steps, say m.B e c a u s e w cannot be reached from w0 in a ﬁnite number of steps by the
12We cannot verify such uniqueness analytically, but will verify it with numerical examples later.
12supposition, T−m(w) 6= w0 and T−m(w)c a n n o tb er e a c h e df r o mw0 in a ﬁnite number of steps.
In fact, T−m(w)c a n n o tb er e a c h e df r o mw0 at all because, if it can ever be reached from w0,t h e
number of steps needed is ﬁnite by the previous result. At the wage T−m(w), there is an outﬂow
of workers because of endogenous and exogenous separation, but there is no inﬂow of workers.
The measure of workers employed at this wage must be zero in the stationary equilibrium.
Therefore, the equilibrium is a wage ladder that has a ﬁnite number of rungs. Denote wi =
Ti(w0). The set of employed wages in equilibrium is Ω =( wi)M
i=1,w h e r eM is a ﬁnite integer and
wi >w i−1 for all i =2 ,3...,M.13 If λ0 ≥ λ,t h e nw1 >w 0;i fλ0 < λ,t h e nw1 <w 0 is possible.
The wage ladder may contain only one wage level or no wage at all. This can happen if, for
example, the unemployment beneﬁt( w0)i ss u ﬃciently close to productivity (y). However, when
y is suﬃciently higher than w0, adding even a small amount of on-the-job search (i.e. λ positive,
but very close to 0) generates a non-degenerate wage distribution Ω (i.e. M>1). Since the case
λ = 0 corresponds to previous directed search models, those models’ prediction that the wage
distribution is degenerate is not robust to the introduction of on-the-job search.
We depict the wage ladder in Figure 2a. Each wage wi attracts only the wi−1-applicants, as
pictured by the arrows. Exogenous separation, which takes the separated workers to unemploy-
ment, is not depicted here.
posted wages
w1 w2 wi-1 wi       wi+1        wM
   …..   ….
   w0=b w1 w2 wi-1 wi       wi+1        wM
employed wages
Figure 2a
With the wage ladder as the equilibrium, an applicant applies only to the wage one rung
above his current wage, and so the quit rate of a worker employed at w is ρ(w)=λ(w)q(T(w)).
The applicant does not apply to wages two or more rungs above because it is not optimal to do
so, not because he does not have access to those higher wages. The lower employment probability
accompanying these higher wages make these wages an inferior tradeoﬀ between wage and the
13Each equilibrium wage on the ladder is necessarily a mass point of the wage distribution. In contrast, a mass
point cannot exist in on-the-job search models where search in undirected, e.g., Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
There, the argument is that a ﬁrm can increase the wage oﬀer slightly above the mass point, which increases
the number of applicants the ﬁrm gets by a discrete amount (as a result of undirected search) and hence increases
expected proﬁt. This argument becomes invalid when search is directed, because it is not optimal for the applicants
to respond to a marginal increase in the wage oﬀer by a discrete increase in the application probability — doing so
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We can illustrate this tradeoﬀ in equilibrium by a diagram similar to Figure 1. However,
the iso-proﬁt curve must be replaced by ﬁrms’ free-entry condition, h(w)[Jf(w) − Jv]=C.
Substituting Jf from (2.9), ρ(w)=λ(w)q(T(w)) and Jv = 0, we can write this condition as:
q(w)=Ψ
µ





where Ψ is a decreasing function deﬁn e di n( 2 . 5 ) .F i g u r e2 b depicts a possible case of this free-
entry condition, in which the condition gives q as a decreasing and concave function of w.E v e r y
equilibrium wage level is a tangency point between the indiﬀerence curve of a particular type of
applicants and the free-entry condition. Figure 2b shows two such wages, T(wi) for the applicants
at wage wi and T2(wi) for the applicants at wage T(wi). For a wi-applicant, a job opening at
wage T2(wi) is inferior to an opening at T(wi) because the former oﬀers a much lower employment
probability.
The tradeoﬀ between wage and the employment probability is common in all directed search
models, with or without on-the-job search. The diﬀerence is that on-the-job search makes an
agent’s payoﬀ dependent on future strategies, which signiﬁcantly complicates the task of ﬁnding
an equilibrium. In particular, the ﬁrm’s value function Jf(w) depends on the employee’s future
application decision, T(w), which in turn makes the free-entry condition for ﬁrms oﬀering w
dependent on this future application decision. Similarly, an applicant’s indiﬀerence curve depends
on the future application decision through the worker’s value function Je(w). Such dependence
makes it diﬃcult to verify the properties of the curves presumed in Figure 2b. A general translation
of the diagram into a mathematical formulation yields very little about the analytical properties
of the equilibrium (see the supplementary Appendix H).
14In the few sections to follow, we will explore the recursive structure of the wage ladder to ﬁnd
the analytical properties of the equilibrium. By focusing on the recursive approach, we are able
to construct the equilibrium and in the process to provide some intuition. To do so, we need to
show that the conﬁguration in Figure 2a leaves no incentive for ﬁrms and applicants to deviate.
Because one ﬁrm’s deviation to a wage outside the equilibrium set sends its potential employee oﬀ
the equilibrium path for the application for higher wages in the future, we need to specify what
ﬁrms would do to the applicants whose wages happen to lie outside Ω.14 Because it is optimal
for a ﬁrm to oﬀer equal probability to all applicants, as discussed before, we impose throughout
the paper the following restriction on beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path:
Restriction (Oﬀ-eqm): The employment probabilities satisfy q(w,w0)=q(w)f o r
a l la p p l i c a n t s ’t y p e sw0 ∈ < and for all wage oﬀers w, including w0 / ∈ Ω0 and w/ ∈ Ω.
Before proceeding further, we simplify the notation. Denote ni = n(wi)a n dvi = v(wi)f o r
each wi ∈ Ω,w i t hn0 = u,a n dai = a(wi,w i−1). Writing q and h as functions of a, rather than
of w, we transform (2.3) and (2.4) as follows:
hi = h(ai) ≡ 1 − e−ai, qi = q(ai) ≡ (1 − e−ai)/ai. (3.3)
Clearly, h0(a) > 0a n dq0(a) < 0. Also, let ρi b et h er a t ea tw h i c hawi-worker endogenously
separates from the job. Then, (2.1) and (2.7) become:
for i ≥ 2: ai = λni−1/(vik), ρi−1 = λqi,
for i =1 : a1 = λ0u/(v1k), ρ0 = λ0q1.
(3.4)
4. Characterizing and Computing the Equilibrium
There are many potential types of deviations from the ladder depicted in Figure 2a.I n t h i s
section, we characterize the equilibrium by temporarily imposing the following restriction:
Temporary Restriction (One-rung): For all i ∈ {0,...,M− 1} and all deviations
wd ∈ (wi,w i+1), either (i) the ﬁrm posting wd attracts only applicants at wi−1 and
after receiving the job, such a worker’s next application is to wi+1,o r( i i )t h eﬁrm
posting wd attracts only applicants at wi and after receiving the job, such a worker’s
next application is to wi+2.
We will eliminate this restriction in section 6 but, for now, the restriction simpliﬁes the character-
ization of the equilibrium. This restriction asks that a deviation should disturb the wage ladder
by only one rung, in either the type of applicants whom the deviation attracts or the direction
in which the deviator’s employee will apply to other jobs in the future.
14If the belief oﬀ the equilibrium path is unrestricted, an arbitrary set of wages may be supported as an equilib-
rium. For example, consider an arbitrary set of wages Ω and suppose that for each wage wi in this set, the ﬁrms
recruiting at wi give positive employment probability only to wi−1-applicants. Then, even a slight deviation from
wi−1 will reduce the recruit’s future employment probability for higher wages to zero. Knowing this, workers may
not apply to the deviating ﬁrm at all, and this successfully supports Ω as an equilibrium.
154.1. Wages Lower Than the Highest Level
Examine wage wi ∈ Ω for 1 ≤ i ≤ M − 1. Consider a deviation wd ∈ (wi−1,w i+1). Under the
restriction One-rung, there is no loss of generality to suppose that the deviating ﬁrm intends to
attract only the applicants at wi−1,i nw h i c hc a s ewd c a nb er e g a r d e da sad e v i a t i o nf r o mwi
because a wi−1-applicant who gets the job wd will apply to wi+1 next.15 Let ad be the queue
length of wi−1 applicants whom wd attracts. Then, the deviating ﬁrm’s hiring probability is h(ad)
and each applicant’s employment probability is q(ad), given by (3.3) with ad replacing a.A f t e r
an applicant gets the job, the probability of future quit rate is λqi+1 (note that we invoked the
restriction Oﬀ-eqm here). If the deviating ﬁrm successfully hires a worker, the ﬁrm’s and the
employee’s value functions are as follows, which are adapted from (2.9) and (2.10):
Jf(wd)=
y − wd
r + σ + λqi+1
, (4.1)
Je(wd)=
wd + σJu − λS + λqi+1Je(wi+1)
r + σ + λqi+1
. (4.2)
It is more convenient to formulate the deviator’s decisions as (wd,a d), rather than (wd,qd). Taking
(qi+1,J e(wi+1)) and other ﬁrms’ strategies as given, the decisions (wd,a d)s o l v et h ef o l l o w i n g
problem similar to (P):






For wi to be an equilibrium wage, the solution to (Pd)m u s tb e( wd,a d)=( wi,a i). The
ﬁrst-order conditions and the constraint of (Pd) yield:
Je(wi) − Je(wi−1)= ai
eai−1−aiJf(wi),
qi [Je(wi) − Je(wi−1)] = E(wi−1),
where Jf(wi)a n dJe(wi) obey (4.1) and (4.2), respectively, with wi replacing wd.T h e ﬁrst
equation states that the applicant’s surplus after getting the job, Je(wi) − Je(wi−1), is a share
ai/(eai − 1) of the total surplus. Notice that this share decreases endogenously with the queue
length ai.





r + σ + λqi+1
. (4.3)
15There are two other cases, but the same analysis applies with i being renumbered. The ﬁr s ti st h a tt h e
deviating ﬁrm intends to attract wi workers with w
d ∈ (wi,w i+1). In this case, the restriction One-rung requires
the wi-worker who gets the job w
d to apply next to wi+2,a n ds ow
d can be treated as a downward deviation from
wi+1. The second is that the deviating ﬁrm intends to attract wi−2 workers with w
d ∈ (wi−1,w i). In this case,
One-rung requires the wi−2-worker who gets the job w
d to apply next to wi,a n ds ow
d can be treated as an upward
deviation from wi−1.
16With this condition, we rewrite the ﬁrst-order conditions of (Pd)a sf o l l o w s :
Je(wi) − Je(wi−1)=C/fi, (4.4)
E(wi−1)=qi [Je(wi) − Je(wi−1)] = Cqi/fi, (4.5)
where
fi = f(ai) ≡ q(ai)(eai − 1 − ai). (4.6)
Finally, for wi−1-applicants to incur the ﬁxed cost of application, the market surplus E(wi−1)
must be greater than or equal to S. With (4.5), this requirement becomes
ai ≤ ¯ a,w h e r e e¯ a − 1 − ¯ a = C/S. (4.7)
Under the restriction One-rung, the conditions (4.3) — (4.7) ensure that (wi,a i)a r eo p t i m a l
for attracting wi−1-applicants among all wages in (wi−1,w i+1), for any i ∈ {1,...,M− 1}.
4.2. Highest Wage in Equilibrium
The highest wage wM must satisfy (4.3) — (4.7), for i = M, in order to ensure that it is the optimal
wage for attracting wM−1-applicants. In addition, there should not be incentive for a ﬁrm to post
a wage higher than wM.A d e v i a t i o n w∗ >w M can be intended for attracting the applicants
at wM or at other wages. However, to rule out a proﬁtable deviation w∗ >w M, it is necessary
and suﬃcient to require that posting w∗ >w M to attract wM-applicants is not proﬁtable.16
To express this requirement formally, consider a single ﬁrm that deviates to w∗ >w M with an
intention to attract wM-applicants, and let a∗ be the queue length of wM-applicants whom the
deviation attracts. Then,
q(a∗)[Je(w∗) − Je(wM)] = S, (4.8)
where Je(w)=( w + σJu)/(r + σ)f o rb o t hw = w∗ and wM. The deviator’s expected surplus
is h(a∗)Jf(w∗), where Jf(w∗)=( y − w∗)/(r + σ). This deviation is not proﬁtable if and only
if the ﬁrm’s maximum expected surplus is less than the vacancy cost C. Solving the deviator’s
maximization problem subject to (4.8), this requirement becomes:
wM >y− (r + σ)Se¯ a, (4.9)
where ¯ a is deﬁned in (4.7). Clearly, for this condition to be satisﬁed and yet wM ≤ y, we need
S>0. This is why we introduced the ﬁxed cost of application.
To explain intuitively why S>0 is needed for an equilibrium, suppose S =0a n dwM <y .
A ﬁrm that deviates to a slightly higher wage wM +ε (ε > 0) can always attract wM-applicants,
16This condition guarantees that it is not proﬁtable to post w
∗ >w M to attract wM−j-applicants, for j ≥ 1. The
proof consists of two stages. First, by construction, wM yields the highest expected surplus to wM−1-applicants
and hence those applicants prefer to apply to wM to all other wages w
∗ >w M. Second, if wM−1-applicants prefer
wM to w
∗ >w M, so do all other applicants at wages wM−j (j ≥ 2). The proof for the second stage is similar to
that of Lemma 6.4 later and hence omitted.
17and so it can succeed in hiring almost surely. Relative to posting wM, the deviation gives the
ﬁrm a slightly lower ex post surplus but a discrete increase in the hiring probability. Thus, the
deviation is proﬁtable. To prevent such proﬁtable deviations, wM must be equal to or greater
than y, which yields negative expected net proﬁt, after the vacancy cost is deducted.
For future use, it is useful to express (4.7) and (4.9) for i = M as requirements on the hiring
probability at wage wM,a sf o l l o w s : 17
1 − (1 + ¯ a)e−¯ a <h M ≤ 1 − e−¯ a. (4.10)
4.3. Recursive Characterization
The conditions in previous subsections provide a recursive characterization of the equilibrium.
Pick up a number hM that satisﬁes (4.10). Then, qM+1 =0 .M o r e o v e r ,
aM = −ln(1 − hM), qM = hM/aM,
wM = y − (r + σ)C/hM, Je(wM)=( wM + σJu)/(r + σ).
T h er e s u l tf o rwM comes from setting i = M in (4.3), and the result for Je(wM) from setting
i = M and wd = wM in (4.2). Proving by induction (see Appendix B), we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.1. (Recursive)G i v e nhM, qM−j+1, wM−j and Je(wM−j), the following condi-
tions hold in equilibrium for j =0 ,1,2,...,M− 2:
hM−j =
(r + σ + λqM−j+1)C
y − wM−j
, (4.11)
aM−j = −ln(1 − hM−j),q M−j = hM−j/aM−j, (4.12)
wM−j−1 = wM + λS −
λqM−jC
fM−j

























The recursive method generates the sequence (hi,a i,q i,w i,J e (wi)) for given hM.F o r t h e
sequences to be an equilibrium, the value of hM must be such that the generated value of Je(w1)
satisﬁes (4.4) for i = 1. We will examine such existence in the next subsection.
17For i = M, (4.7) is equivalent to hM ≤ h(¯ a)=1− e
−¯ a. To rewrite (4.9), note that hM [Jf(wM) − Jv]=C in
equilibrium and Jf(wM) − Jv =( y − wM)/(r + σ).
18Once the equilibrium sequence of (h,a,q) is determined, we can obtain the distributions of
workers and vacancies. First, because the equilibrium is stationary, the measure of workers who
separate from wi must be equal to the measure of workers newly recruited at wage wi.T h a ti s ,
(σ + λqi+1)ni = λni−1qi, for all 2 ≤ i ≤ M,




These equations solve for u and (ni)M
i=1. Second, (3.4) implies
vi = λni−1/(aik)f o ri ≥ 2, and v1 = λ0u/(a1k). (4.17)
Together with
PM
i=1 vi = 1, these equations solve for k and (vi)
M
i=1. The density of oﬀer wages is
(vi)
M
i=1 and of employed wages (ni/(1 − u))
M
i=1.
4.4. Hiring Probability at the Highest Wage and the Number of Rungs
The equilibrium values of M and hM are such that (4.4) is satisﬁed for i = 1. That is, starting
with hM, the computed sequence of Je satisﬁes ∆ =0 ,w h e r e∆ ≡ Je(w1) − Ju − C/f1. Setting
j = M − 2 in (4.14) to obtain Je(w1) and substituting (4.15) for Ju, we get:
∆ =











By Proposition Recursive, the computed a sequence and wM depend on the chosen values of
(M,hM), but not on Ju directly. Hence, we write ∆ = ∆(M,hM). Equilibrium values of (M,hM)
solve ∆(M,hM)=0 .
To examine the function ∆(M,hM), we maintain the following assumption.
Assumption 1. (Regularity)D e ﬁne ¯ a by (4.7). Assume that the following conditions hold:
b ≤ y + λ0S − C
·
(r + σ)ea + λ0




(r + σ)/λ >f(¯ a)/¯ a. (4.20)
The condition (4.19) ensures that there is at least one wage level that yields a higher present
value to the workers than unemployment, while (4.20) is a technical condition necessary for
exploring Proposition Recursive. The following lemma is proven in Appendix B.
Lemma 4.2. Fix hM at any value h∗ that satisﬁes (4.10), and compute the a sequence by
Proposition Recursive. Then, there exists an integer M∗ ≥ 1 such that ∆(M0,h ∗) ≥ 0 for all
M0 ≤ M∗ and ∆(M0,h ∗) < 0 for all M0 ≥ M∗ +1 .
19Now we can ﬁn dt h el o w e s te q u i l i b r i u mv a l u eo fhM as follows. Choose h∗ in the above
lemma to be the lower bound on hM given by (4.10) and obtain the corresponding M∗. Then,
∆(M∗,h ∗) ≥ 0. If ∆(M∗,h ∗) = 0, then the chosen value of h∗ is the lowest equilibrium value
of hM. Suppose ∆(M∗,h ∗) > 0. Then ∆(M∗ +1 ,h ∗) < 0. Reset M = M∗ + 1 and increase
h∗. By Proposition Monotone established later, the a sequence is an increasing function of the
chosen value of hM.S oi swM.T h u s ,∆(M,h∗) is an increasing function of h∗ (for given M). For
there to be an equilibrium solution for hM, ∆(M,h∗)m u s ti n c r e a s et oc r o s s0w h e nh∗ increases
to the upper bound in (4.10). The ﬁrst crossing gives the lowest equilibrium value of hM,w h e r e
M = M∗ + 1 is the equilibrium value of M.
Similarly, we can ﬁnd the highest equilibrium value of hM. To do so, choose the upper bound
of hM,1−e−¯ a, to be the starting value of h∗ in the above lemma and compute the corresponding
M∗.I f∆(M∗,h ∗) = 0, then the starting value of h∗ is the highest equilibrium value of hM.I f
∆(M∗,h ∗) > 0, then ﬁx M = M∗ and reduce h∗. For there to be an equilibrium solution for hM,
∆(M,h∗) must decrease to cross 0 when h∗ decreases to the lower bound of hM in (4.10). The
ﬁrst crossing gives the highest equilibrium value of hM,w h e r eM = M∗ is the equilibrium value
of M. Therefore, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 4.3. (M-exists)S e th∗ =1 −(1 + ¯ a)e−¯ a and compute M∗ as in Lemma 4.2. There
exists an equilibrium value of hM if and only if
∆(M∗,1 − e−¯ a) ≥ 0. (4.21)
Under this condition, there exist hL and hH, which possibly coincide with each other, such that
all equilibrium values of hM lie in [hL,h H]. The equilibrium value of M is either M∗ or M∗ +1 .
It is analytically diﬃcult to verify (4.21) or to check whether the solution for hM is unique.
In section 5.2 we will provide some numerical examples.
5. Properties of the Equilibrium
We delay to section 6 the proof that, even without the restriction One-rung, the wage ladder
constructed in the previous section can be an equilibrium. In the current section, we investigate
the properties of the equilibrium. Whenever possible, we will suppress the index i = M − j,u s e
the subscript ±t to stand for M − j ± t,w h e r et ≥ 1.
5.1. Analytical Properties
To study the properties of the equilibrium, we examine the properties of the sequence computed
with any given value of hM that satisﬁes (4.10). We start by deriving some useful equations from
Proposition Recursive. Subtracting (4.13) for j and j + 1, we get:
w − w−1 =






20This condition holds for all i = M − j,w h e r ej ∈ {1,2,...,M− 2}.F o rj =0 ,r e p l a c et h el a s t
term in the equation by λCq(¯ a)/f(¯ a)=λS.A l s o ,f o ra l lj ∈ {1,...,M− 2},w eh a v e : 18
h−1 =( r + σ + λq)
Áµ
r + σ + λq+1
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A similar equation holds for j =0 ,w i t ht h eﬁrst q+1 being replaced by 0 and the term λq+1/f+1
by λq(¯ a)/f(¯ a)=λS/C.
We establish the following propositions, in Appendices C and D, respectively.
Proposition 5.1. (Monotone) For any given hM that satisﬁes (4.10), the sequence constructed
in Proposition Recursive has the following monotonicity properties for all 0 ≤ j ≤ M − 2 (where
the subscript M − j is suppressed):
a−1 <a≤ ¯ a, h−1 <h , q−1 >q . (5.3)
(r + σ)/λ >f(a−1)/a−1. (5.4)
a−1 >a− ln(1 + a), (5.5)
da/dhM > 0,d w / d h M > 0. (5.6)
Proposition 5.2. (W-property) For any given hM that satisﬁes (4.10), the computed sequence
satisﬁes: (i) w>w −1 and (ii) E(w−1) >E (w) ≥ S. In addition, if the necessary condition for
the equilibrium described later in Lemma No-leap holds, then (iii) w − w−1 >w +1 − w.
These propositions reveal interesting properties of the equilibrium, as listed below:
• A ﬁrm is more likely to succeed in hiring at a higher wage than at a lower wage, while an
applicant is more successful getting a low-wage job than a high-wage job. This result arises
from the fact that the queue length of applicants increases endogenously with wage.
• A worker at a high wage is less likely to quit than a worker at a low wage. The quit rate of
a worker at wage w is ρ(w)=λq(a+1). Because the employment probability for the next
wage (q(a+1)) decreases as wage increases, the quit rate falls.
• The longer a worker has been employed since his last unemployment, the higher his cur-
rent wage is on average. Moreover, the higher wage a worker had just before becoming
unemployed, the longer he will take on average to return to this previous wage level.
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The ﬁrst equality comes from using (4.11) for j + 1, the second equality from rewriting, the third equality from
using (4.11) for j, and the last equality from substituting (5.1).
21• A worker’s ex post value of employment increases with wage. That is, Je(w) >J e(w−1),
which we used in Lemma Singleton. Also, E(wi) ≥ S for all 1 ≤ i ≤ M − 1. So, all
applicants employed below the highest wage are indeed willing to incur the ﬁxed cost S to
apply to higher wages.
• The gap between two adjacent rungs on the ladder shrinks as a worker climbs up the ladder.
So, the higher the wage, the smaller the wage gain in the next job change.
• An applicant’s expected surplus diminishes as the applicant moves up the wage ladder, i.e.,
E (w−1) >E (w), despite the fact that the ex post value of employment increases with
wage. This implies that an applicant’s employment probability must decrease more rapidly
than the increase in wage along the wage ladder.
All these properties are realistic features of the labor market. What is special about these
properties is that they all originate from the search frictions, not from exogenous diﬀerences
between workers. The last property is a necessary (although not a suﬃcient) condition for the
wage ladder to be an equilibrium in a directed search environment. Since an applicant observes
all oﬀers, to induce him to apply only to the next wage level, the expected surplus must be higher
from applying for such jobs than for the jobs at higher wages.
The next proposition describes some features of the wage density in the equilibrium (see the
middle part of Appendix D for a proof):
Proposition 5.3. (W-density) The density (frequency) of oﬀer wages decreases with wage. A





1 − (1 + ¯ a)e−¯ a
¯ a − ln(1 + ¯ a)
. (5.7)
When r is suﬃciently close to 0,as u ﬃcient condition for the above inequality is C/S > 2.373.
As u ﬃcient condition for the density of employed wages to be increasing at the upper end of the
wage support is σ/λ <q (¯ a).
The density of oﬀer wages is a decreasing function. This result is opposite to what Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) established in a on-the-job search model with undirected search. Our result
is easy to understand. In the stationary equilibrium, the ﬂow of workers into every equilibrium
wage w must be equal to the outﬂow. Because the outﬂow consists of exogenous separation and
quits, the inﬂow must exceed the number of quits. The inﬂow of workers into w is the number
of new hires at w,i . e . ,hv.T h e n u m b e r o f q u i t s f r o m w is equal to the number of new hires
at the next wage level, h+1v+1, because the applicants at w are the sole source of hiring at the
next wage. Thus, hv > h+1v+1 in the stationary equilibrium. This necessarily implies v>v +1,
because the hiring probability at w is lower than that at w+1. Therefore, the density of oﬀer
wages necessarily decreases with wage.
22The density of employed wages can also be decreasing, but it is not always so. This is because
the density of employed wages depends on both the inﬂow and the outﬂow of workers. Although
there is a larger ﬂow of workers into a low wage than into a high wage, the quit rate is also higher
for a low wage than for a high wage. There are more workers employed at a low wage than at
a high wage if and only if the diﬀerence between the inﬂows into the two wages is larger than
the diﬀerence between the outﬂows. This is satisﬁed at the upper end of the wage distribution
if the hiring cost is large relative to the application cost. In general, however, the density of
employed wages may not be monotonic with respect to wages and if it is monotonic, it may not
be increasing.
5.2. Numerical Examples
We provide numerical examples to illustrate the equilibrium. Consider the following values of the
parameters: y = 1000, b =0 ,C = 60, S =1 ,r =0 .02, λ =0 .025, λ0 =0 .2, and σ =0 .125.
These parameter values satisfy all requirements for an equilibrium (see Proposition 6.7). Under
these parameter values, there is a unique equilibrium and the wage distribution has four rungs.
T h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ei su =4 0 .9% and the overall vacancy-worker ratio is k =0 .41.19 Other
characteristics of this equilibrium are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Equilibrium in a numerical example
i wi vi (%) ni
1−u (%) ai qi (%) hi (%)
1 947.6 95.7 87.8 0.21 90.4 18.6
2 982.6 4.0 11.2 0.78 69.6 53.9
3 988.9 .2 1.0 1.77 46.9 83.0
4 990.8 <.1 .1 2.94 32.2 94.7
These numerical results conﬁrm the analytical properties of (w,a,q,h,v) established in Propo-
sitions Monotone and W-property. A notable feature is that the small diﬀerence between two
adjacent wages induces large diﬀerences in the employment probability, the hiring probability
and the density of oﬀer wages. For example, when the wage increases from 947.6t o9 8 2 .6, the
employment probability falls sharply from 90.4% to 69.6%, the hiring probability increases from
18.6% to 53.9% and the density of oﬀer wages falls from 95.7% to 4.0%. A predominant fraction
of ﬁr m sr e c r u i ta tt h el o w e s tw a g e .
The density of employed wages is also a decreasing function of wages in this equilibrium. A
large fraction of workers are employed at the lowest wage, although the distribution is less skewed
toward low wages than the oﬀer wage distribution.
In Tables 3 we illustrate the importance of on-the-job search for the wage ladder, by changing
λ while ﬁxing other parameters (including λ0). When λ = 0, on-the-job search is shut down and,
as previous models of directed search predict, the wage distribution is degenerate, with w = 953.2,
19It is possible to ﬁnd parameter values which allow for the possibility of multiple equilibria (with diﬀerent
number of rungs).
23a = .21, u =4 0 .9% and k = .40. However, the wage ladder becomes non-degenerate as soon as
workers can search while employed. Even for λ =1 0 −4, the support of equilibrium wages is
signiﬁcantly dispersed. This result illustrates that the degeneracy of the wage distribution in
previous directed search models is not robust. As the opportunity of on-the-job search increases
further, most of the characteristics of the equilibrium change very little. The support of the
distribution Ω, the employment probabilities {qi}, the hiring rates {hi}, the unemployment rate
u and market tightness k remain very similar. Even though the employment probabilities upon
applying are unaﬀected, workers get to apply more often as λ increases, and as a result, the
distributions of oﬀer and employed wages become less skewed.
Table 3. Various degrees of on-the-job search
λ =0 λ =1 0 −4 λ = .01 λ = .025
w1 953.2 953.2 951.0 947.6
w2 984.0 983.4 982.6
w3 989.6 989.4 988.9
w4 991.0 990.9 990.8
λ =0 λ =1 0 −4 λ = .01 λ = .025
a1 .21 .21 .21 .21
a2 .79 .78 .78
a3 1.82 1.80 1.77
a4 3.28 3.13 2.94
% λ =0 λ =1 0 −4 λ = .01 λ = .025
v1 100 99.9 98.2 95.7
v2 <.1 1.8 4.0
v3 <.1 <.1 .2
v4 <.1 <.1 <.1
% λ =0 λ =1 0 −4 λ = .01 λ = .025
n1
1−u 100 99.9 94.7 87.8
n2
1−u <.1 5.1 11.2
n3
1−u <.1 .2 1.0
n4
1−u <.1 <.1 .1
λ =0 λ =1 0 −4 λ = .01 λ = .025
u 40.9% 40.9% 40.9% 40.9%
k .40 .40 .40 .41
6. Wage Ladder Is an Equilibrium
In this section, we eliminate the restriction One-rung imposed in section 4 and show that the wage
ladder is an equilibrium under certain conditions. We divide wages that violate the restriction
One-rung into two categories, those that belong to the equilibrium wage support and those that
lie outside. The two subsections below examine the two categories in turn. The restriction Oﬀ-
eqm is maintained throughout. As in the previous section, we suppress the index i = M − j
whenever possible and use the subscript ±t to stand for M − j ± t.
6.1. Workers Apply Only to the Next Wage Level
In this subsection, we conﬁne deviating wages to the equilibrium set of wages, Ω. A wage w ∈ Ω
is a deviation that violates the restriction One-rung if the wage w is intended to attract the
applicants at wi−1 but w 6= wi. For such deviations to be not proﬁtable, the expected surplus
that a wi−1-applicant obtains from applying to wage wi must be larger than or equal to that from
applying to any other wage in Ω.T h a ti s ,
q[Je(w) − Je(w−1)] ≥ q+t [Je(w+t) − Je(w−1)]. (6.1)
24This requirement hold for all t ∈ {1,2,...,j} and all j ∈ {1,2,...,M− 1}. N o t i c et h a tw eh a v e
invoked Restriction Oﬀ-eqm to compute the payoﬀ of a w−1-applicant who applies to wages other
than w, because such application is oﬀ the equilibrium path.
Lemma 6.1. For all j and all t ≥ 2,i ft h ew−1-applicants prefer applying to a job at wage w to
a job at w+1, then so do the w−t-applicants.
Proof. Suppose that the w−1-applicants prefer to apply to w relative to w+1, i.e.,
q[Je(w) − Je(w−1)] ≥ q+1 [Je(w+1) − Je(w−1)].
For all t ≥ 2, we have
q[Je(w) − Je(w−t)] − q+1 [Je(w+1) − Je(w−t)]
= {q[Je(w) − Je(w−1)] − q+1 [Je(w+1) − Je(w−1)]} +( q − q+1)[Je(w−1) − Je(w−t)].
The diﬀerence in {.} is non-negative by the supposition. The last term on the right-hand side is
also positive, because q>q +1 and Je(w−1) >J e(w−t) for all t ≥ 2. Thus, the above deference is
positive, implying that applying to w yields a higher expected surplus for a w−t-applicant than
applying to w+1. QED
The intuition for the above lemma is the same as that for Lemma Singleton. An applicant
at wage w−1 is more willing to sacriﬁce the employment probability for the wage level than an
applicant at lower wages w−t (t ≥ 2). If the high employment probability oﬀered with wage w
is more attractive to an applicant at w−1 than the higher wage w+1,i tm u s tb es oa sw e l lt oa n
a p p l i c a n ta tl o w e rw a g e sw−t.
The above lemma signiﬁcantly reduces the number of inequalities we need to verify for (6.1).
For each j ∈ {1,2,...,M− 1},i ts u ﬃces to verify (6.1) for only t = 1. However, there are still







For given a+1,d e ﬁne φ(a+1)a st h es o l u t i o nf o ra to the equality form of (6.2). Because the
left-hand side of (6.2) is a decreasing function of a, the inequality is equivalent to a ≤ φ(a+1).
We prove the following lemma in Appendix E:
Lemma 6.2. The function φ(.) exists, is unique for each a+1, and has the following properties:
(i) φ0 > 0;( i i )a+1 > φ(a+1) >a +1 − ln(1 + a+1);a n d( i i i )i fa ≤ φ(a+1),t h e na−1 < φ(a).
Property (iii) in Lemma 6.2 says that an applicant at wage wM−2 has the strongest incentive
among all applicants to leap on the wage ladder. To verify (6.2) for all j ∈ {1,2,...,M− 1},i ti s
suﬃcient to verify it for j =1 . F o rj = 1, (6.2) becomes aM−1 ≤ φ(aM), which is equivalent to
25hM−1 ≤ h(φ(aM)). Express (5.2) for j =0b yr e p l a c i n gq+1 by 0 and λq+1/f+1 by λS/C.U s i n g


























Rewriting this condition further, we have:20
Lemma 6.3. (No-leap) Given the wage levels computed in Proposition Recursive, it is optimal
























6.2. Deviations That Lie Outside the Equilibrium Wage Support
Now we examine deviations that violate the restriction One-rung and lie outside Ω.L e t wd ∈
(w−1,w) be such a deviation. This deviation can violate One-rung either in the type of applicants
it attracts, or in the direction in which the prospect employee will apply to other jobs, or in both.
The following lemma narrows down the types of such deviations we need to consider.
Lemma 6.4. The following statements are true regarding any deviation wd ∈ (w−1,w).( i )I fa n
applicant gets the wd-job, then his future application is to either w or w+1.( i i )I fw−2-applicants
do not have incentive to apply to wd, then neither do w−t-applicants, where t ≥ 3.
Proof. For (i), we show that a wd-applicant does not have incentive to apply to w+t, for all
t ≥ 2. Suppose that a worker gets the job wd.L e tJd
e(wd) be the value function of such a worker
employed at wd. Because this worker is not restricted to applying to w+1 next, Jd
e(wd)m a yn o t
obey (4.2). However, whatever job opportunities a worker at wd will have in the future, a worker
employed at wage w will have as well with the same probability (under Restriction Oﬀ-eqm).
Thus, Jd
e(wd) <J e(w). For the worker employed at wd, applying to w+1 next yields a higher
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. So, the fact






h(φ(aM)). Moreover, if the right-hand side of the condition is an
increasing function of aM (which seems true from numerical examples), then we can replace (6.3) by the following
suﬃcient condition (using the facts that aM ≤ ¯ a and C/S =( e














26The ﬁrst inequality follows from our previous result that a w-applicant prefers to apply to w+1
relative to w+t for all t ≥ 2. The second inequality comes from the facts that q+t <q +1 for all
t ≥ 2a n dJe(w) >J d
e(wd).






≤ q−1 [Je(w−1) − Je(w−2)],
where qd is the probability with which an applicant to wd gets the job. Using an argument similar
to that established Je(w) >J d
e(wd), we have Jd
e(wd) >J e(w−1). Then, the above inequality












+ qd [Je(w−2) − Je(w−t)] − q−1 [Je(w−1) − Je(w−t)]
≤ q−1 [Je(w−1) − Je(w−2)] + qd [Je(w−2) − Je(w−t)] − q−1 [Je(w−1) − Je(w−t)]
<q −1 [Je(w−1) − Je(w−2)] + q−1 [Je(w−2) − Je(w−t)] − q−1 [Je(w−1) − Je(w−t)]
=0 .
The ﬁrst inequality follows from the supposition about w−2-applicants, and the second inequality
from qd <q −1. Therefore, a w−t-applicant gets a higher expected surplus from applying to w−1
than to wd. QED
The intuition for the above lemma is similar to that for Lemma Singleton. This similarity
is obvious for part (ii), because part (ii) extends Lemma 6.1 to wages outside the equilibrium
support and Lemma 6.1 relies on the intuition for Lemma Singleton. To see the link between part
(i) and Lemma Singleton, notice that w>w d. According to the intuition for Lemma Singleton,
an applicant at w is more willing to sacriﬁce the employment probability for the wage level than
an applicant at wd. Because the high employment probability with wage w+1 is more attractive
to a w-applicant than higher wages, it must be even more attractive to an applicant at the lower
wage wd.
Under the above lemma, only the following two types of deviations still need be ruled out:
(I) The deviation wd ∈ (w−1,w) attracts w−1-applicants and, after getting the job
with wd, such a worker will apply to w in the future.
(II) The deviation wd ∈ (w−1,w) attracts w−2-applicants and, after getting wd,s u c h
a worker will apply to w+1.
Figure 3 depicts these two deviations, where the dashed arrows indicate the deviating ﬁrm’s
source of applicants and its employee’s future application. A type I deviation is proﬁtable only
when the support of the wage distribution is too sparse. A type II deviation is proﬁtable only
when the support is too dense, and it is meaningful only when the number of rungs on the wage
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Consider ﬁrst a type I deviation wd ∈ (w−1,w). Let Jd
f(wd) be the deviating ﬁrm’s value
function after successfully recruiting a worker and Jd
e(wd) the value function of a worker who









wd + σJu − λS + λqJe(w)
r + σ + λq
.
21Other deviations and, in particular, the following two types of deviations, are not proﬁtable. The ﬁrst is like
the one depicted in the upper panel of Figure 3, but with the employee at w
d applying to w+1 in the future.
This deviation can be viewed as a downward deviation from w that satisﬁes One-rung and, by construction, the
deviation is dominated by w. The second deviation is like the one depicted in the lower panel of Figure 3, but with
the employee at w
d applying to w in the future. This deviation can be viewed as an upward deviation from w−1
that satisﬁes One-rung and, by construction, the deviation is dominated by w−1.
28These functions are diﬀerent from those in (4.1) and (4.2), because the worker’s future application
direction is diﬀerent from the one depicted in Figure 2a (again, we invoked Oﬀ-eqm).
For the deviation wd to be proﬁtable, it must satisfy the following conditions:
(Ia) By applying to wd,aw−1-applicant’s expected surplus is equal to E(w−1);
(Ib) The deviating ﬁrm earns an expected surplus greater than C.
These two conditions cannot be both satisﬁed. To see this, suppose that the deviation satisﬁes








e(wd)a n dJe(w−1) into the above equation, we solve wd as follows:
wd = w−1 +( r + σ + λq)Cq/(fqd). (6.5)
The deviating ﬁrm’s expected surplus is π(ad)=hdJd
f(wd), where hd is the ﬁrm’s hiring proba-










































− 1 − a∗
ea − 1 − a
C,
where the second equality comes from substituting h−1 = e−a∗
f/q, and the third equality from
the deﬁnition of f. Because (ea − 1 − a) is an increasing function, a necessary condition for the
deviation to be proﬁtable is a∗ >a . However, a queue length ad >awill not attract any w−1
applicants. To see this, note that a w-worker is employed at a higher wage than a wd-worker and
has all future job opportunities that a wd-worker will have. Thus, Je(w) >J d
e(wd). If ad >a ,
then qd <q , which would lead to the following contradiction to (6.4):











Therefore, we have established the following lemma:
Lemma 6.5. (Type-I) A type I deviation is not proﬁtable.
The explanation is as follows. A type-I deviation wd ∈ (w−1,w) competes against an equilib-
rium wage w for the same applicants (i.e., w−1-applicants). In comparison with w, the deviation
wd oﬀers a w−1-applicant not only a lower wage but also a lower value for future application. For
29the deviation to attract this applicant, it must provide a signiﬁcantly higher employment proba-
bility than a job opening at w does. This implies that the deviating ﬁrm’s hiring probability must
be signiﬁcantly lower than that of a ﬁrm recruiting at w. In this case, the deviator’s expected
surplus from recruiting will not be high enough to cover the vacancy cost.
Now consider a type II deviation wd ∈ (w−1,w), depicted in the lower panel in Figure 3. With
this deviation, the deviating ﬁrm’s ex post value Jd
f(wd) and the employee’s value Jd








wd + σJu − λS + λq+1Je(w+1)
r + σ + λq+1
. (6.7)
In contrast to a type-I deviation, a type-II deviation changes not only the applicant’s current
payoﬀ but also the future payoﬀ, by changing the potential employee’s future application. As a
r e s u l t ,i ti sm o r ed i ﬃcult to prove that a type-II deviation is not proﬁtable. The following lemma
is proven in Appendix F:










A type II deviation is not proﬁtable if and only if the following condition is satisﬁed:
β∗ − h(β∗)ea−1 +
r + σ + λq+1
r + σ + λq
(ea−1 − 1 − a−1) ≥ 0. (6.9)
It is diﬃcult to verify (6.9) analytically, because the condition involves three variables (a−1,a,a +1).
However, it is satisﬁed in the numerical example in section 5. We conclude this section by sum-
marizing the results on existence in the following proposition.
Proposition 6.7. Maintain Assumption Regularity and Restriction Oﬀ-eqm. An equilibrium
with the described wage ladder exists under the conditions in Proposition M-exists, Lemma No-
leap and (if M ≥ 3) Lemma Type-II.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the equilibrium in a large labor market where employed workers
search on the job and ﬁrms direct workers’ search intentionally using wage oﬀers and employment
probabilities. All applicants observe all posted job openings before the application. There is
wage dispersion among workers, despite the fact that all workers (and all jobs) are homogeneous.
Moreover, equilibrium wages form a ladder and workers choose to climb up the ladder over time,
one rung at a time. This occurs without the familiar elements that prevent workers from jumping
30over the ladder, such as a gradual increase in productivity, diﬀerential information among workers,
and intentional discrimination by ﬁrms according to workers’ current wages.
Other properties of the wage ladder are as follows: (i) a low-wage job is easier to be obtained
than a high-wage job, and so a low-wage job experiences a higher quit rate than a high-wage
job; (ii) The distance between two adjacent rungs on the wage ladder becomes smaller as wage
increases; (iii) The longer a worker has been employed since his last unemployment, the higher his
current wage is on average and, the higher wage a worker had just before becoming unemployed,
the longer time he will take to return to the previous wage level; (iv) the density of oﬀer wages is
a decreasing function; and (v) the wage density is decreasing at high wages when the hiring cost
is larger relative to the application cost. In particular, properties (ii), (iv)-(v)a r en o tt r u ei nt h e
undirected search framework with on-the-job search. On the other hand, directed search models
without on-the-job search generate a degenerate wage distribution among homogeneous workers.
In fact, our numerical results show that this degeneracy is not robust, because allowing for even
a very small probability of on-the-job search generates a non-degenerate wage ladder.
We have illustrated how useful search frictions can be in explaining labor market phenomena.
When search is directed, wages can direct workers’ applications ex-ante and as a result, both the
meeting technology and the division of the surplus are endogenized. When on-the-job search is
allowed, the tradeoﬀ between wages and employment (hiring) probability, which is the underlying
principle of directed search, leads to a wage ladder equilibrium. We could use that same framework
to look at various extensions, such as learning by doing on the job or match speciﬁc productivity.22
22One way to introduce learning by doing is to assume that workers’ productivity depends on their positions
on the wage ladder, speciﬁcally that each time they move up the ladder, their productivity increases by some
increment, and that their skills fully depreciate when they lose their job. This would allow the worker’s labor
market history to remain tractable, yet carry the ﬂavor of learning by doing. Of course, some of the properties
of equilibrium (such as the fact that ﬁrms oﬀer the same employment probability to all workers) may not hold
anymore, as ﬁrms may not be indiﬀerent as to the type of workers it would like to attract.
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32Appendix
A. Properties of f(a) and g(a)
In this appendix we establish the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. Deﬁne f(.) as in (4.6) and g(.) as follows:


























2 − (ea − 1 − a)
2
i
− (ea − 1 − a)
3 > 0. (A.2)
Furthermore, if (r + σ)/λ >f(a)/a then g0(a) < 0 for all a>0.





















































= −(1 − e−a)+( ea − 1 − a)e−a = −ae−a < 0,
where the symbol ∼ means “having the same sign as”.






> 0. Substituting q(a)=1−e−a














a3ea ,w h e r e
f1(a)=( a − 2)e2a +( a +4 ) ea − (a2 +2 a +2 ) .
Note that f1(0) = 0. Denote the nth order derivative of f1(a)b yf1(n)(a). We have:
f1(1)(a)=( 2 a − 3)e2a +( a +5 ) ea − (2a +2 ) ,w i t hf1(1)(0) = 0,
f1(2)(a)=( 4 a − 4)e2a +( a +6 ) ea − 2, with f1(2)(0) = 0,






=( 8 a +4 ) ea +1> 0 for all a ≥ 0.
The last two results imply that f1(3)(a) >f1(3)(0) > 0f o ra l la>0 ,w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e st h a t








33We can establish (A.2) using the same procedure. Denote the left-hand side of (A.2) tem-
porarily as LHS(a). Then, LHS(i)(0) = 0 for i =0 ,1,2, and
LHS(3)(a) = 27(a − 1)e3a +( 1 6 a + 72)e2a −
³
4a2 +3 1 a +5 1
´
ea +6 .
Because (a − 1)ea +1> 0 for all a>0, (a − 1)e3a > −e2a. Substituting this result for the ﬁrst
term in LHS(3)(a), we have LHS(3)(a) >
¡
12a2 +3 0 a − 6
¢
ea+6. The last expression has a value
0a ta = 0 and a positive derivative for all a>0. Thus, LHS(3)(a) > 0. Then, for all a>0, we
have LHS(2)(a) >L HS (2)(0) = 0, LHS(1)(a) >L HS (1)(0) = 0 and LHS(a) >L HS (0) = 0.
Finally, we show that g0(a) < 0 for all a>0i f( r + σ)/λ >f(a)/a. Compute:



















































where g1(a)=( 3− a)e3a − (5a +9 ) e2a +( 7 a2 +9 a +9 ) ea − (2a3 +7 a2 +7 a + 3) (correction
to (3 − a)e3a − (5a +9 ) e2a +( 7 a2 +1 3 a +9 ) ea − (2a3 +7 a2 +7 a + 9; the calculations should
also be corrected accordingly.) Verify that g1(0) = 0, g1(1)(0) = −4 < 0, g1(2)(0) = −8 < 0,
g1(3)(0) = −12 < 0, and g1(4)(a)=eag2(a), where
g2(a) = (135 − 81a)e2a − (80a + 304)ea +7 a2 +6 5 a + 129.
Verify that g2(0) = −40 < 0, g2(1)(0) = −130 < 0, g2(2)(0) = −234 < 0a n dg2(3)(a)=eag3(a),
where
g3(a) = (108 − 648a)ea − (80a + 544).
Verify that g3(0) = −436 < 0a n dg30(a) < 0 for all a ≥ 0. Tracing all the way back, we have
g1(a) < 0 for all a>0a n ds og0(a) < 0 for all a>0. QED
B. Proofs of Proposition Recursive and Lemma 4.2
We prove Proposition Recursive by induction. The argument preceding the proposition in the
text has already established (4.11) and (4.12) for j = 0. To verify (4.13) and (4.14) for j =0 ,s e t
i = M − 1( a n dwd = wM−1) in (4.2) to obtain an equation for Je(wM−1). Using this equation
and substituting Je(wM), we get:
Je(wM) − Je(wM−1)=
wM − wM−1 + λS
r + σ + λqM
.
Combining this equation with (4.4) for i = M − 1, we obtain (4.13) and (4.14) for j =0 .
Now suppose that (4.11) — (4.14) hold for an arbitrary j ∈ {0,1,...,M− 3}. We show that
they also hold for j +1 and so, by induction, the proposition holds. For j +1, (4.11) comes from
34setting i = M − (j + 1) in (4.3), and (4.12) from the deﬁnitions of hM−(j+1) and qM−(j+1).T o
verify (4.13) and (4.14) for j +1 ,s e ti = M − j − 2( a n dwd = wM−j−1) in (4.2) to obtain an

















The second equality comes from substituting (4.14) for j, which holds by supposition. Combining
the above result with (4.4) for i = M − (j + 1), we obtain (4.13) and (4.14) for j +1 .
Finally, the zero-proﬁt condition (4.3) must hold for a ﬁrm posting w1. By the above deriva-
tion, this implies that (4.11) and (4.12) must hold for j = M − 1. In contrast, (4.13) and (4.14)
need be modiﬁed for j = M −1. By deﬁnition, w0 = b and Je(w0)=Ju. To derive (4.15), use the
wage ladder to simplify (2.11) as rJu = b − λ0S + λ0q1 [Je(w1) − Ju]. Substituting [Je(w1) − Ju]
from (4.4) (with i = 1), we obtain (4.15). This completes the proof of Proposition Recursive.
Now, we prove Lemma 4.2. Because M is unknown, we start with an arbitrary but suﬃciently
large integer m and set hm = h∗,w h e r eh∗ is any value that satisﬁes (4.10). Compute the sequence
(am−t)t≥0 according to Proposition Recursive and deﬁne
δi(m)=











Note that δ1(M)=∆(M,h∗), where ∆ is given by (4.18). By Proposition Monotone in the text
(proven later), am−t−1 <a m−t ≤ ¯ a<∞ for all t ≥ 0. Since 1/fm−t and qm−t/fm−t are both





















Because C/f (¯ a) is bounded away above 0, the sequence δi decreases by a strictly positive amount
each time when i decreases. If δm(m) ≥ 0, then there exists i∗ such that δi ≤ 0 for all i ≤ i∗
and δi > 0 for all i ≥ i∗ +1 . I nt h i sc a s e ,l e tM∗ = m − (i∗ − 1) and compute the sequence
{δi(M∗)} by setting hM∗ = h∗. Then, δi(M∗) ≤ 0 for all i ≤ 1a n dδi(M∗) > 0 for all i ≥ 2.
Moreover, for any integer M0 6= M∗, the sequence {δi(M0)} computed by setting hM0 = h∗ satisﬁes
δ1(M0)=δ(M∗−M0+1)(M∗). From the properties of the sequence {δi(M∗)},w eh a v eδ1(M0) > 0
for all M0 ≤ M∗ − 1a n dδ1(M0) < 0 for all M0 ≥ M∗ + 1. This is the result in Lemma 4.2.
Finally, we show that δm(m) ≥ 0, indeed. After substituting wm = y − C(r + σ)/hm,t h e
condition δm(m) ≥ 0 becomes
b ≤ y + λ0S −
C [(r + σ)eam + λ0]
eam − 1 − am
.
The right-hand of this inequality is an increasing function of am.B e c a u s e am is bounded from
below by ¯ a − ln(1 + ¯ a) according to (4.10), a suﬃcient condition for the above inequality is that
it holds for this lower bound of am, which is imposed as (4.19). QED
35C .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o nM o n o t o n e
First, we verify (5.3) and (5.4) by induction. To begin, we show that these conditions hold for
j = 0. By (4.10), aM ≤ ¯ a.S i n c eh(a) is an increasing function and q(a) a decreasing function, all
three inequalities in (5.3) are equivalent to each other, and so we show hM−1 <h M only. Since
(5.2) holds for j = 0 after replacing the term q+1 by 0 and λq+1/f+1 by λS/C, hM−1 <h M if
and only if
0 <











eaM − 1 − aM
−
1











w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ed e ﬁnition of ¯ a in (4.7) to replace S/C.B e c a u s eaM ≤ ¯ a by construction
(see (4.10)) and (ea − 1 − a) is an increasing function, the term in the ﬁrst (.)i sp o s i t i v e .A l s o ,
f(a)/a is an increasing function, as shown in Appendix A, and so Assumption Regularity implies
(r + σ)/λ >f(¯ a)/¯ a ≥ fM/aM. That is, the term in the second (.) above is also positive. Thus,
hM−1 <h M, verifying (5.3) for j =0 .
Now that aM−1 <a M ≤ ¯ a,a n dt h a tf(a)/a is an increasing function of a, (4.20) implies
(r + σ)/λ >f(aM−1)/aM−1.T h a ti s ,( 5 . 4 )h o l d sf o rj =0 .
Suppose that (5.3) and (5.4) hold for an arbitrary j ∈ {1,2,...,M− 3}. We show that they
hold for j + 1. For (5.3), this amounts to proving h−2 <h −1. Computing h−2 using (5.2),
h−2 <h −1 if and only if
0 <














Because h−1 <hby supposition, a suﬃcient condition for the above inequality is:
0 <














The last term is equal to g(a−1). In Appendix A we showed that g0(a) < 0i f( r+σ)/λ >f(a)/a.
Because (r + σ)/λ >f(¯ a)/¯ a,w eh a v eg0(a) < 0 for all a ≤ ¯ a.S i n c ea−1 <aby supposition and















=( r + σ)/f(a) > 0.
That is, (5.3) holds for j + 1. This in turn implies a−2 <a −1.B e c a u s ef(a)/a is an increasing
function of a (see Appendix A), the supposition (r + σ)/λ >f (a−1)/a−1 implies (r + σ)/λ >
f(a−2)/a−2. That is, (5.4) also holds for j + 1. By induction, (5.3) and (5.4) hold for all
j ∈ {0,1,...,M− 2}.


























36The equalities follow from calculating f and h(a − ln(1 + a)) explicitly. Because q>q +1,t h e
above inequality clearly holds, and so does (5.5).
Finally, we show that da/dhM > 0a n ddw/dhM > 0 for any hM that satisﬁes (4.10). From
(4.13) it is easy to see that da/dhM > 0i m p l i e sdw/dhM > 0; so, we need to prove only
da/dhM > 0. Because aM = −ln(1 − hM), it is obvious that daM/dhM > 0. If da+t/dhM ≥ 0
for all t ≥ 1i m p l i e sda/dhM > 0, then by induction, da/dhM > 0. Suppose that da+t/dhM ≥ 0f o r




/(y − w). Totally diﬀerentiating this relationship







































Because wM = y−(r+σ)C/hM, dwM/dhM > 0. Because da+t/dhM ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 1, a suﬃcient

















To verify this inequality, temporarily denote the left-hand side of the inequality by LHS. Because

















After substituting (q,f,q0,f0), the right-hand side of this inequality has the same sign as the
expression, (ea − 1)
h
a(ea − 1)
2 − (ea − 1 − a)
2
i
−(ea − 1 − a)
3, which is positive for all a>0a s
shown in Lemma A.1 in Appendix A. Thus, the required condition LHS > 0h o l d s .QED
D. Proofs of Propositions W-property and W-density
We prove Proposition W-property ﬁrst. Using (4.13) and (4.14), it is easy to verify (i) in the
Proposition. Property (ii) holds because E(w−1)=Cq/f > Cq+1/f+1 = E(w)a n dE(wM−1) ≥ S
(see (4.9) or equivalently the ﬁrst part of (4.10)).













where R =( r+σ)/λ. For the computed sequence to be an equilibrium we need q>q +1 (1 + f/f+1)
(see (6.2)), as shown in section 6. Under this condition, the left-hand side of the above inequality













37This is clearly positive, because a<a +1 and f (.) is an increasing function. Thus, Proposition
W-property holds.
To prove Proposition W-density, recall that the density of oﬀe rw a g e si s( vi) and of employed
wages (ni/(1 − u)), where i =1 ,2,...,M. So, the density of oﬀer wages is a decreasing function



















Similarly, the result holds for i =2 ;i . e . ,v1/v2 >h 2/h1 > 1.
The density of employed wages is a decreasing function iﬀ σ/λ >q−q+1.B e c a u s eqM+1 =0 ,
the density of employed wages is decreasing at the upper end of the wage support (i.e. nM−1 >
nM)i ﬀ σ/λ >q M. Because q(.) is a decreasing function and aM ≥ ¯ a − ln(1 + ¯ a) by (4.10), a
suﬃcient condition for nM−1 >n M is σ/λ >q (¯ a − ln(1 + ¯ a)), which can be rewritten as (5.7).
When r is suﬃciently close to 0, this condition is satisﬁed iﬀ (r+σ)/λ >q (¯ a−ln(1+¯ a)). Because
(r+σ)/λ ≥ f(¯ a)/¯ a by Assumption Regularity, (5.7) is satisﬁed if f(¯ a)/¯ a>q(¯ a − ln(1 + ¯ a)), which
is equivalent to ¯ a>1.605 and hence to C/S > 2.373. Similarly, because aM ≤ ¯ a by (4.10), a
suﬃcient condition for nM−1 <n M is σ/λ <q (¯ a). QED
E. Proof of Lemma 6.2
To show that φ(a+1)i sw e l l - d e ﬁned for each a+1 by the equality form of (6.2), we use the deﬁnition





ea − 1 − a
ea+1 − 1 − a+1
¸
=1 . (E.1)
The left-hand side of (E.1) is a decreasing function of a and an increasing function of a+1 (note
that a+1 >a ). If φ(a+1)i sas o l u t i o nf o ra, then the solution is unique and satisﬁes φ0 > 0,
verifying part (i) of the lemma. When a = a+1, the left-hand side of (E.1) is 0, which is less than
the right-hand side. When a → 0, the left-hand approaches 1/q(a+1) > 1. Thus, the solution for
a, φ(a+1), indeed exists and is unique. This argument also establishes the inequality φ(a+1) <a +1
in part (ii) of the lemma.
For the inequality φ(a+1) >a +1 − ln(1 + a+1) in part (ii), we show that the left-hand side
of (E.1) is greater than 1 (the right-hand side) when a = a+1 − ln(1 + a+1). Substituting this
particular value of a and re-arranging terms, the condition to be established becomes ln(1+a+1)−
a+1
1+a+1 > 0. The left-hand side of this inequality is equal to 0 when a+1 = 0, and its derivative
with respect to a+1 is a+1/(1 + a+1)2 > 0. Thus, the desired inequality holds for all a+1 > 0.


































Because the expressions in these conditions are single-variable functions which do not have any
parameter, we can graph them using a computer and show that the inequalities hold, indeed.
(However, it is diﬃcult to prove them using pen and paper.)
Now, suppose a ≤ φ(a+1). We show a−1 < φ(a) or, equivalently, h−1 <h (φ(a)). Under (5.2),
this desired condition is equivalent to:














Because a ≤ φ(a+1) by supposition, h ≤ h(φ(a+1)), and so a suﬃcient condition for the above
inequality is
























































The ﬁrst inequality comes from (E.2) and the result (r+σ)/λ >f(a)/a in Proposition Monotone,




























This is the desired result. QED
F .P r o o fo fL e m m aT y p e - I I
Consider a type-II deviation wd ∈ (w−1,w). This deviation induces the value Jd
f(wd)t ot h eﬁrm
and Jd
e(wd) to the worker who gets the job, where Jd
f is given by (6.6) and Jd
e by (6.7). Suppose
that the deviation is proﬁtable. Then it must satisfy the following conditions:
(IIa) By applying to wd,aw−2-applicant’s expected surplus is equal to E(w−2);
(IIb) The deviating ﬁrm earns an expected surplus greater than C;















C [Je(w) − Je(w−1)] + 1











The last equality comes from substituting (Jd
e(wd),J e(w)) and using (4.4). Solve for wd:












The deviating ﬁrm’s expected surplus is π(ad)=hdJd
f(wd). Substituting (Jd
f(wd),wd)a n d










































Because a−1 >a− ln(1 + a) by Proposition Monotone, it can be shown that A>a −1.T h e
unconstrained maximum of π(ad)i s :
π(A)=C
³
eA − 1 − A
´
/(ea−1 − 1 − a−1) >C .
Thus, a type II deviation is not proﬁtable if and only if the constraint (IIc) keeps ad as u ﬃcient
distance away from A.










.U s i n g ( 4 . 4 ) t o
substitute Je(w+1), noting that Je(w) − Jd
e(wd)=( w − wd)/(r + σ + λq+1), and substituting wd












Let β be the level of ad that satisﬁes (F.3) as equality. Since qd = q(ad) is a decreasing function
of ad, (F.3) is equivalent to ad ≥ β.
Because A is the unique maximizer of π(ad)a n dπ(A) >C ,t h e r ee x i s tA1 and A2,w i t h
A ∈ (A1,A 2), such that π(Ai)=C,f o ri =1 ,2. Clearly, π(ad) >Ciﬀ ad ∈ (A1,A 2), and
π0(A1) > 0 > π0(A2). Because a type II deviation must satisfy ad ≥ β (i.e., the constraint (IIc)),
the deviation is not proﬁtable if and only if either β ≥ A2 or β ≤ ad ≤ A1. In the remainder of
this proof, we rewrite these conditions to obtain the condition (6.9) in the lemma. Let us denote
Y = q+1/[(q − q+1)f+1] in this appendix.
40First, we show that β >A 1,a n ds ot h ec a s eβ ≤ ad ≤ A1 never occurs. The inequality β >A 1






















Here we have used the deﬁnition of q(β) ﬁrst and then the deﬁnition of A1 to substitute for q−1.
Re-arranging terms and using the deﬁnition of β∗ in (6.8), the above inequality is equivalent to









=1− (1 + a)e−a.
As u ﬃcient condition for β∗ >A 1 is then A1 <a− ln(1 + a). Because a − ln(1 + a) <a −1 by
Proposition Monotone and a−1 <Aa ss h o w ni nt h et e x t ,a − ln(1 +a) <A . Because π0(ad) > 0
for all ad <Aand π(A1)=C,t h e nA1 <a− ln(1 + a)i ﬀ π(a − ln(1 + a)) >C . Calculating
π(a − ln(1 + a)) and re-arranging terms, the latter condition becomes q(a − ln(1 + a)) >q −1,
which is satisﬁed because q(.) is a decreasing function and a−ln(1 + a) <a −1.N o wt h a tβ >A 1,
at y p eI Id e v i a t i o ni sn o tp r o ﬁtable iﬀ β ≥ A2.
Second, we show that β ≥ A2 iﬀ β∗ ≥ β. Similar to the above procedure that showed β >A 1
iﬀ β∗ >A 1, we can show that β ≥ A2 iﬀ β∗ ≥ A2.B e c a u s e β∗ >A 1, as shown above, and







































Using the equation that deﬁnes β to substitute for q−1, we can rewrite the above inequality further
as q(β∗) ≤ q(β). Thus, β ≥ A2 holds iﬀ β∗ ≥ β.







r + σ + λq+1











































(ea−1 − 1 − a−1)/h(β∗).





;t h et w oe q u a l -
ities come from substituting the deﬁnitions of h(β∗)a n df. Multiplying the last expression by
h(β∗) yields (6.9). QED
41Supplementary Appendices for the Manuscript:
“Directed Search On the Job and the Wage Ladder”
by
Alain Delacroix and Shouyong Shi
G. Simplifying a Recruiting Firm’s Strategy
In the text of the paper, we claimed that a recruiting ﬁrm’s decision can be modelled as announcing
a wage level and an ex ante employment probability, rather than ex post selection criteria that
the ﬁrm will use to select one worker out of the received applicants. We also claimed that the
optimal choice of employment probabilities must be the same for all types of applicants. In this
supplementary appendix, we prove these results.
Consider a ﬁrm posting wage w and examine its ex post selection criteria. Let R(w0)b et h e
number of w0-applicants whom this ﬁrm will receive and denote R =( R(w0))w0 as the vector of
such numbers. The ﬁrm’s selection rule is a matrix of probabilities, (Z(w0,R))w0,R; The element
Z(w0,R) describes the probability with which the selected worker is a w0-worker, conditional
on the composition of received applicants R. Conditional on R and that the selected worker is
a w0-applicant, each particular w0-applicant who applied to the ﬁrm is chosen with probability
Z(w0,R)/R(w0). Clearly, the ﬁrm cannot select a w0-worker if no such applicant has applied to
the ﬁrm, and the selection probabilities must add up to one if the ﬁrm has received one or more
applicant. That is, the following restrictions must hold:
Z(w0,R)=0i fR(w0)=0 , (G.1)
X
w0
Z(w0,R)=1i fR 6= 0, and 0 otherwise. (G.2)
In addition, we exclude lexicographic selection rules by imposing the following restriction:
If Z(w0,R) > 0 for a particular R such that R(w0) > 0,
then Z(w0,R) > 0 for all such R that R(w0) > 0.
(G.3)
That is, if a ﬁrm selects a type of applicants with positive probability in some cases, then it
must select such applicants with positive probability in all cases, provided that they show up
at the match. The reason for imposing this restriction is that lexicographic selection rules may
induce pure strategy equilibria which feature implicit coordination. Note that the ﬁrm can rank
the applicants probabilistically. In particular, we do not restrict the selection probabilities to be
equal for all types of received applicants, although this is a result we will establish later.
Let q(w,w0) denote the (ex ante) employment probability that the ﬁrm recruiting at wage w
oﬀers to each w0-applicant. Do not impose q(w,w0)=q(w), because this is a result we need to
prove in this supplementary appendix.
Proposition G.1. Suppose that ﬁrms announce (w,Z),w h e r eZ satisﬁes (G.1) — (G.3). Agents’






Proof. Suppress the particular ﬁrm’s wage oﬀer w in various notation. Let R be the set
containing the realizations of R, which is the composition of applicants whom the ﬁrm receives.
Let Γ(.) be the distributional function of R, with a density γ(.). Because a w0-applicant applies















where the expression in [.] is the probability with which the ﬁrm receives exactly a number R(w0)
of w0-applicants.
We reformulate the ﬁrm’s problem. Under (w,Z), the ﬁrm’s objective function, i.e., the











The equality follows from the fact that the wage to be paid is independent of the type of the
applicant whom the ﬁrm will select ex post and of the realization of R. The double summation


















R∈R\{0} γ(R)=1− Γ(0) = h.
(G.5)
The ﬁrst equality comes from switching the order of the two summations. The second and third
equalities come from (G.2), i.e., that the sum of Z(w∗,R)o v e rw∗ is 0 when R =0a n d1w h e n
R 6= 0. The fourth equality comes from the deﬁnition of Γ( 0 )a n dt h el a s te q u a l i t yf r o mt h e
meaning of the hiring probability.
Therefore, the ﬁrm’s objective function is h[Jf(w) − Jv], as in subsection 2.2. Suppose that












This is a general version of (2.4). We can formulate the ﬁrm’s decision problem as choosing
(a,q,w)t os o l v e :
(P0)m a x h(w)[Jf(w) − Jv]
s.t. (2.3), (G.6), and (2.6),
where in (2.6), q(w) should be replaced by q(w,w0). As claimed, this problem involves the ex
ante employment probabilities rather than the ex post selection criteria.
Next, we reformulate the applicant’s decision problem. Consider a particular w∗-applicant
who contemplates applying to the ﬁrm. Shorten the notation q(w,w∗)t oq(w∗), which stands
2for the applicant’s ex ante probability of getting the job. (Note that q(w∗) here is not the short
form for q(w∗,w)a sw eu s e di nt h et e x t . )T oc a l c u l a t eq, we need the distribution function of the
composition of the ﬁrm’s received applicants other than the particular w∗-applicant in discussion.
This is the distribution function of R conditional on that the particular w∗-applicant applies to
the ﬁrm, and hence it is diﬀerent from the unconditional distribution Γ. Denote the composition
of the ﬁrm’s received applicants other than the particular w∗-applicant by R−.L e t R− be the
set of vectors containing the possible values of R− and γ−(.,w∗) the density function of R−.
Conditional on that the particular w∗-applicant applies to the ﬁrm, the composition of applicants
whom the ﬁrm receives is R,w h e r eR(w0)=R−(w0)i fw0 6= w∗ and R(w∗)=R−(w∗)+1
otherwise. With a realization of R− in addition to the particular w∗-applicant, the ﬁrm chooses
a w∗-applicant with probability Z(w∗,R), out of which the particular w∗-applicant is the chosen











R(w∗) [Je(w) − Je(w∗)]γ−(R−,w∗)





= q(w∗)[Je(w) − Je(w∗)].
The ﬁrst equality follows from the fact that the wage the applicant gets is independent of the
realization of R−, and the second equality from (G.7). The above result shows that what matters
to an applicant is the wage oﬀer and the ex ante employment probability q,a sw ec l a i m e d .
Finally, we show that h satisﬁes (G.4). To do so, we ﬁnd the relationship between the two


















R−(w∗) [1 − p(w∗)]
λ(w∗)n(w∗)L−1−R−(w∗) .


























R(w∗) [1 − p(w∗)]
λ(w∗)n(w∗)L−R(w∗) .
Here we have used the result, a(w∗)=p(w∗)λ(w∗)n(w∗)L,a n dt h ef a c tR(w∗)=R−(w∗)+1 .
































The second equality uses (G.5). This completes the proof of the proposition. QED
Lemma G.2. (Equal-employment)I ti so p t i m a lf o raﬁrm to give equal employment proba-
bility to all applicants. That is, q(w,w0)=q(w) for all such w0 that a(w,w0) > 0.
Proof. Consider the recruiting ﬁrm’s decision problem (P0) formulated in the proof of the
previous Proposition. For all such w0 that a(w,w0) > 0, the optimal choice of a(w,w0)s a t i s ﬁes















where µ is the Lagrangian multiplier of (G.6). Clearly, the above equation implies that q(w,w0)
is independent of w0. QED
H. Another Characterization of the Equilibrium
In the text, we used Figure 2b to illustrate the equilibrium heuristically. We did not translate
Figure 2b into a mathematical formulation but, instead, claimed that such a formulation yields
very little about the analytical properties of the equilibrium. In this supplementary appendix, we
formulate Figure 2b mathematically, discuss the analytical diﬃculties of using this formulation,
and then use a numerical example to show that this formulation yields the same equilibrium as
the recursive formulation in the text.
Figure 2b indicates two steps in the characterization of the equilibrium. First, given a function
q(.) that determines the employment probability at each wage level, the applicants choose the
target set of wages T(.). Second, anticipating the dependence of the applicants’ decisions on q(.),
recruiting ﬁrms compete by oﬀering (w,q(w)) and the competition drives each recruiting ﬁrm’s
net proﬁt to zero, i.e., the expected surplus from recruiting to the level of the vacancy cost.
To formulate the ﬁrst step, pick any decreasing employment probability function, q(.). For
each w ∈ <, q(w) gives the probability with which an applicant to a ﬁrm oﬀering w will be selected.
Note that this employment probability must be speciﬁed for all w, not only for equilibrium wages.
For convenience, when the target application set is empty, set q(∅)=0 .D e ﬁne:
F(w)=w + λ(w)max{E(w) − S,0},






The expected surplus of an applicant for a job at w0 is




The applicant applies to w0 only if the expected surplus is greater than or equal to S. Therefore,













In the inner maximization, the applicant takes the function q(.) as given. If the inner maximization
generates a value greater than (r+σ)S, the applicant’s target set T(w)i sn o n - e m p t y .O t h e r w i s e ,
T(w)=∅. With this notation, the case E(w)=S means that a w-applicant does not apply.
An applicant’s decision depends on the function F and, by deﬁnition, F depends on the ap-
plicant’s market surplus. Thus, the three objects (F(.),E(.),T(.)) must be solved simultaneously
for the given function q(.). We can combine the tasks by substituting the above formula of E(w)













This is a ﬁxed-point problem for F. Under reasonable conditions we can show that the right-hand
side of (H.1) is a contraction mapping, and so there is a unique function F(.)t h a ts a t i s ﬁes the
functional equation. However, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a meaningful condition to ensure that the
set of maximizers T(w) is singleton. Even if we assume that T(w) is singleton, it is diﬃcult to
complete the second step of the characterization of the equilibrium.
The second step determines the employment probability function through the free-entry con-
dition, (3.2). Rewrite (3.2) as q(w)=Pq(w), where P is the following mapping:
Pq(w)=Ψ
µ





Then, q(.)i saﬁxed point of the mapping P.
It is diﬃcult to examine the ﬁxed-point problem for q, because the maximizer T(w)t ot h e
ﬁxed-point problem (H.1) appears in the mapping P.T os e et h ed i ﬃculty, note that we need the
given function q(.) in (H.1) to be decreasing in order to ensure well-behaved ﬁxed point F.I n
turn, this requires that the ﬁxed point of P be decreasing, and hence that P maps decreasing
functions into decreasing functions. However, we cannot ﬁnd meaningful conditions to guarantee
that P has this property. All such conditions involve T, which in turn involves the very object
q(.) that we need to determine in equilibrium.
None of these analytical diﬃculties would be present if there were no on-the-job search, i.e.,





, which is indeed a decreasing (and concave)
5function of w. For all w 6= w0, F(w)=w.F o rw = w0, F(w0) is given by (H.1), with F(w0)o n
the right-hand side of that equation being replaced by w0 and q(.) by the function just obtained.
The above formulation shows why it is diﬃcult to analytically examine on-the-job search in a
directed search environment. The recursive procedure presented in the text is useful for tackling
this problem and to obtain analytical properties of the equilibrium.
Nevertheless, the above formulation suggests the following procedure to compute an equi-
librium numerically. Start with a decreasing function q(.)a n dﬁnd the ﬁxed point F in (H.1).
Substitute the maximizer T into (H.2) to compute Pq(w). Then, use this solution Pq(w)t o
serves the role of q(w) in (H.1). Repeat the process until Pq(.)=q(.).
To see whether the above formulation and the recursive formulation in the text generate the
same equilibrium, consider the following parameter values: r =0 .02, y = 1000, b =0 ,C = 60,
S =1 ,λ = λ0 = .025, and σ = .125 (this is the example of section 5.2, except for λ = λ0).
Discretize the interval between b and y, and set the number of points on the grid to be 25000.
The equilibrium number of rungs on the wage ladder is M = 4 in both formulations. Refer to the
above formulation as “ﬁxed-point” and the recursive formulation “recursive”, we list the results
as follows:
w1 w2 w3 w4
recursive 929.005 980.004 988.339 990.679
ﬁxed-point 929.043 980.401 988.640 990.760
discrepancy 0.004% 0.040% 0.031% 0.008%
The results under the two formulations are very close to each other. The maximum discrepancy
in equilibrium wages between the two formulations is about 0.04 percent. The discrepancy arises
for two reasons. First, the two formulations discretize diﬀerent objects in the numerical procedure.
With the recursive formulation, we discretize the interval of the hiring probability hM and, with
the ﬁxed-point formulation, we discretize the interval of the wage level. Second, the function q(w)
is highly nonlinear. It remains ﬂat at low wages but sharply declines at high wages, with a slope
approaching −∞ as w approaches the upper bound. Such nonlinearity reduces the accuracy of
the numerical results. Taking such sources of discrepancy into account, we conclude that the two
formulations yield the same equilibrium.
6